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We have r e c e i v e d  an i n c r e a s i n g  number of  r e q u e s t s  f o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  
on t h e  United S t a t e s  c i v i l  d e f e n s e  program and on t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  n u c l e a r  
war. This  I n f o  Pack c o n t a i n s  m a t e r i a l  on n u c l e a r  weapons and on t h e  
a n t i c i p a t e d  p h y s i c a l ,  economic,  and s o c i a l  consequences  o f  n u c l e a r  a t t a c k s  
on t h e  United S t a t e s ,  b a s i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  c i v i l  d e f e n s e  program, and 
m a t e r i a l  d i s c u s s i n g  some of  t h e  arguments ,  p r o  and c o n ,  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  
c i v i l  d e f e n s e  i s s u e .  
Those wish ing  more s p e c i f i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  c i v i l  d e f e n s e  program 
shou ld  w r i t e  t o :  
F e d e r a l  Emergency Management Agency 
O f f i c e  of P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  
1725 I S t r e e t ,  N . W .  
Washington,  D .  C .  20472 
We hope t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  h e l p f u l .  
Congress iona l  Refe rence  
D i v i s i o n  

March 12, 1982 
This paper o u t l i n e s  t h e  F i s c a l  Year 1983 c i v i l  defense program requested 
by t h e  Federa l  Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),  which i s  r espons ib l e  f o r  
emergency-related programs spanning t h e  f u l l  range o f  m i t i g a t i o n ,  preparedness, 
response, and recovery - - in  peace o r  war. 
R e v i t a l  i zed C i  v i  1  Defense Program 
Fol  l ow ing  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  rev iew o f  c i  v i 1  defense programs and po l  i - 
c i es ,  P res iden t  Reagan, on October 2, 1981, announced h i s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  "devote 
g r e a t e r  resources t o  improv ing  our  c i v i l  defenses," as p a r t  o f  h i s  p l a n  " t o  r e -  
v i t a l i z e  our  s t r a t e g i c  f o r ces  and m a i n t a i n  America's a b i l i t y  t o  keep t h e  peace 
we1 1  i n t o  t h e  nex t  century . "  
The fundamental purposes o f  t h e  Na t iona l  C i v i l  Defense Program a re  : 
(1) Tn save American l i ~ c  i n t h e  event o f  a  nuc lea r  a t t ack .  It 
w i l l  save 1  i v e s  by a l spers  I ng people i n t o  r u r a l  areas where t h e y  w i l l  be l e a s t  
a f f e c t e d  by t h e  b l a s t  and thermal  e f f ec t s  o f  t h e  nuc lea r  exp los ions ,  l e a v i n g  
r a d i a t i o n  as t h e  major  hazard f o r  t h e  d ispersed  popu la t i on .  Our goal i s  t o  
double t h e  number of Americans t h a t  would s u r v i v e  f rom a  ma jo r  Sov ie t  a t t a c k  
on t h e  Un i t ed  States.  
( 2 )  To make nuc lear  war l e s s  l i k e l y  by improv ing  our  a b i l i t y  t o  de- 
t e r  t h e  Sov ie t  Union f rom an a t t a c k  on t h e  Un i t ed  States.  I n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  
our  s t r a t e g i c  f o r ces ,  C i v i l  Defense can h e l p  t o  persuade t h e  Sov ie t  l eade rsh ip  
t h a t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  outcome o f  an a t t a c k  by them on t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes  would be 
worse f o r  them than  f o r  us. It a l s o  reduces t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  Sov ie ts  t o  co- 
e rce  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes  d u r i n g  a  p e r i o d  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c r i s i s .  
( 3 )  To p rov i de  an improved c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  States and l o c a l i t i e s  t o  
deal w i t h  t h e  day-to-day. emergencies t h a t  occur  as a  r e s u l t  o f  n a t u r a l  and t ech -  
n o l o g i c a l  hazards. These "dual -use" b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  defense program were 
recognized by t h e  Congress i n  December 1981 amendments t o  t h e  Federal  C i v i l  
Defense Act. 
FY 1983 C i v i l  Defense Proaram 
FEMA's budget f o r  1983 requests  $252,34O,OOO f o r  c i v i l  defense a c t i v i t i e s  
--about $1.10 pe r  cap i t a .  As t h e  f i r s t  yea r  o f  a moderate, m u l t i y e a r  program 
in tended  t o  deploy popu la t i on  p r o t e c t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  requested FY 1983 
budget i s  a  f i r s t  s tep  toward r e b u i l d i n g  reasonable p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  ou r  people. 
The program w i l l  be deployed i n  an o r d e r l y  way--not as a  crash e f f o r t - - a n d  i n  
f u l l  p a r t n e r s h i p  w i t h  S ta tes  and l o c a l i t i e s .  
The t h r u s t  of t h e  program i s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  U.S. p o p u l a t i o n  by r e l o c a t i n q  
(evacua t ing )  people  from l a r g e r  c i t i e s  and o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  r i s k  areas over- a 
p e r i o d  o f  severa l  days d u r i n g  an acu te  c r i s i s ,  and p r o v i d i n g  them w i t h  f a l l o u t  
p r o t e c t i o n  and suppor t .  Capabi 1  i ti es w i  11 a1 so be improved t o  p r o t e c t  people  
i n -p l ace  ( a t  o r  near t h e i r  homes, schools ,  o r  p laces of work) shou ld  t i m e  o r  
c i rcumstances p rec lude  c r i  s i  s re1 o c a t i  on. 
Stud ies  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  balanced, moderate-cost c i  v i l  defense program em- 
phasi  z i  ng c r i s i s  re1 o c a t i  on m igh t  save-- i  n  a  1  arge-sca l  e  a t t a c k  preceded by 
s t r a t e g i c  warning--up t o  t w i c e  as many Americans as t h e  40 percent  expected t o  
s u r v i v e  under p resen t  c i v i l  defense. Such a  balanced program i nc l udes  bo th  
p lans f o r  c r i s i s  r e l o c a t i o n  o f  people f rom p o t e n t i a l  r i s k  areas, and ope ra t i ona l  
systems and c a p a b i l i t i e s  f o r  execu t ion  o f  r e l o c a t i o n  p lans  and f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  from fa1  l o u t .  
Based on ex tens i ve  research and on exper ience i n  peacetime evacuat ions,  
c r i s i s  r e l o c a t i o n  cou ld  be h i g h l y  e f f e c t i v e  i f  two c o n d i t i o n s  e x i s t e d :  ( 1 )  
Complet ion of h i g h  qua1 i t y  o lans,  t oge the r  w i t h  development o f  ope ra t i ona l  
systems and c a p a b i l i t i e s ;  ana ( 2 )  severa l  days o f  warn ing t i m e  i n  which t o  move 
and p r o t e c t  t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  approx imate ly  145 m i l l i o n  people l i v i n g  i n  our  l a r -  
ger c i t i e s  o r  near  impo r tan t  m i l  i t a r y  i n s t a l  l a t i o n s .  
Su rp r i se  a t t a c k  i s  cons idered h i  gh l y  un l  i ke l  y  . Most exper ts  be1 i e v e  t h a t  
an a t t a c k  on t h e  U.S. would come o n l y  i n  t h e  con tex t  of a  l eng thy  p e r i o d  o f  i n -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  c r i s i s .  Moreover, i t i s  1  i k e l y  t h a t  we would have s u f f i c i e n t  warn- 
i n g  t i m e  because t h e  Sov ie t s  must p r o t e c t  t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e i r  urban p o p u l a t i o n  by 
evacua t i  on. 
Evacuat ion exper ience i n  bo th  peacetime and World War I I i s  t h a t  most 
people  w i l l  comply w i t h  o f f i c i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  p rov i ded  t h a t  these a re  under-  
s tandab le  and make sense i n  terms o f  improv ing chances f o r  s u r v i v a l .  I n  f a c t ,  
i n  a  t h r e a t e n i n g  s i t u a t i o n ,  many people  w i l l  l eave  p o t e n t i a l  danger areas on 
t h e i r  own, whether o r  no t  they  have been adv ised t o  do so. 
The FY 1983 program w i l l  p r o v i d e  a  bas i s  f o r  ac t i on ,  i n  f u t u r e  years ,  t o  
pe rm i t  f u l l  deployment o f  r e q u i r e d  capab i l  i t i e s .  The FY 1983 program w i l l  ac- 
c o r d i n g l y  a c c e l e r a t e  a c t i v i t i e s  a1 ready underway (e.g., c r i s i s  re1 o c a t i o n  p l an -  
n ing ,  development o f  S ta te  and l o c a l  Emergency Operat ing Centers)  whi l e y  a t  t h e  
same t ime,  improv ing  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  p lans  and systems. The program w i l l  f e a t u r e  
g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by S ta te  and l o c a l  governments i n  managing t h e  implementa- 
t i o n  and achievement o f  n a t i o n a l  goa ls  and ob jec t i ves .  FEMA w i l l  a l s o  commence 
new programs i n  FY 1983 (e.g., s u r v i v a b l e ,  h i  gh-perfqrmance warning and communi - 
c a t i o n s  systems). The FY 1983 program a l s o  p rov ides  f o r  analyses and p i l o t  ac- 
t i  v i t i e s  i n  t h e  area o f  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  key i n d u s t r i e s  and r e l a t e d  work fo rces .  
FY 1983 Proaram H i ~ h l i a h t s  
I n  t h e  area o f  nuc lea r  c i v i l  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  people,  t h e  FY 1983 r e -  
quest p rov i des  f o r  acce l  e r a t i  ng development o f  c r i  s i  s  re1  o c a t i  on o l  ans. By 
end-FY 1983, augmented S ta te  p l ann ing  s t a f f s  should have compietea about 56 per-.. 
cen t  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  CRP's r e q u i r e d  by l o c a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  throughout  t h e  U n i t e d  
States.  FEMA a1 so proposes t o  acce le ra te  t h e  Nat iona l  She l t e r  Survey, which 
p rov ides  da ta  needed as a  bas i s  f o r  c r i s i s  r e l o c a t i o n  p lanning.  
The most impor tan t  f a c t o r  i n  e f f e c t :  ve c r i s i s  re1 o c a t i o n  i s  publ i c  cooper-  
a t i o n  which, i n  t u r n ,  depends upon t h e  publ i c ' s  unders tanding o f  o f f i c i a l  ad- 
v i c e  and i n s t r u c t i o n s .  FEMA t h e r e f o r e  i n t ends  t o  work w i t h  t he  S ta tes  t o  p ro -  
v i d e  a d d i t i o n a l  c r i s i s  r e l o c a t i o n  maps and i n s t r u c t i o n s .  These i n s t r u c t i o n s  
i r e  in tended t o  be p laced i n  l o c a l  te lephone d i r e c t o r i e s  i n  areas where c r i s i s  
re1 oca t i on  p lans  have been completed. By end-FY 1983, such i n s t r u c t i o n s  shou ld  
be publ i shed  i n  te lephone d i r e c t o r i e s  i n  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  about 25 p e r -  
cent  o f  t h e  t o t a l  U.S. r i s k  popu la t i on .  
A d d i t i o n a l  FY 1983 a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  i n c l u d e  resumption o f  s e l e c t i v e  s h e l t e r  
mark-ing (suspended i n  1973), as w e l l  as work t o  p r o v i d e  a  bas is  f o r  f u t u r e  quan- 
t i t y  procurement o f  aus te re  s h e l t e r  supp l i es  and v e n t i l a t i o n  k i t s .  She l t e r  s igns  
i d e n t i f y  f o r  t h e  c i t i z e n  those bu i  1  d ings  p r o v i d i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  aga ins t  nuc lea r  a t -  
tack  e f f ec t s ,  w h i l e  s h e l t e r  s tocks  pe rm i t  people t o  remain i n  s h e l t e r s  u n t i l  t h e  
dec l  i ne of r a d i a t i o n  l e v e l  s  pe rm i t s  emergence f rom she1 t e r .  
FEMA's FY 1983 request  w i l l  improve t h e  coverage o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  Na t iona l  
Warning System, w h i l e  p repa r i ng  f o r  deployment o f  a  s u r v i v a b l e  rad io -warn ing  
system and o f  a  s u r v i v a b l e  system f o r  communications between t h e  Na t i ona l  , Re- 
g i  onal , S t a t e  and State-Area 1  eve1 s. 
FEMA proposes t o  acce le ra te  t h e  program s t a r t e d  i n  FY 1981 t o  p r o v i d e  
matching funds f o r  development o f  S t a t e  and l o c a l  Emerqencv O ~ w a t i n g  Centers. 
EOC's a re  p r o t e c t e d  s i t e s ,  w i t h  necessary communications, f rom which key l o c a l  
and S ta te  o f  f i  c i  a1 s  d i  r e c t  coord ina ted  o p e r a t i  ons i n  peacetime o r  a t t a c k  emer- 
genci es . ,FEMA proposes a1 so_>& acce le ra te  t h e  program t o  ._ecau.ide-fa-l.louL-bnd 
electroma-qnet ic p u l ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  b-rocddcast s t a t i o n s ,  as well as an 
e ~ ~ e a ~ - p a w e r  generator .  Such p r o t e c t e d  s t a t i o n s  p rov i de  a  c r i t i c a l  compo- 
nent  o f  read iness,  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  p r o v i d e  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  and i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i n  an emergency. Matching funds w i l l  a l s o  be p rov i ded  t o  
enhance e x i s t i n g  S t a t e  and l o c a l  networks f o r  emergency communications. 
The FY 1983 request a l so  p rov ides  f o r  suppor t  of p r o f e s s i o n a l  R a d i o l o g i -  
c a l  Defense O f f i c e r s  a t  t h e  State-Area l e v e l ,  and ex tens ion  o f  t h e  S t a t e - l e v e l  
RDO s t r u c t u r e  be ing  developed i n  FY 1982. F u l l - t i m e  supe rv i so r y  RDO's a re  t h e  
keystone i n  deve lop ing  r a d i o l o g i c a l  defense systems and c a p a b i l i t i e s .  I n  ad- 
d i t i o n ,  c a p a b i l i t i e s  w i l l  be developed t o  produce and deploy,  i n  f u t u r e  years ,  
about 7 m i l l i o n  se ts  o f  i ns t ruments  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  s h e l t e r  and p o s t - s h e l t e r  * 
pe r iods .  
I n  t h e  area of t r a i n i n g ,  t h e  FY 1983 request  p rov ides  f o r  r e s t o r i n g  capa- 
b i  1  i t i e s  t o  p r o v i d e  simulated-emergency exerc iqes  f o r  l o c a l  and S ta te  o f f i  c i a 1  s. 
E f f e c t i v e  execu t ion  of p lans t o  deal w i t h  peacetime o r  a t t a c k  emergencies r e -  
q u i r e s  t h a t  key o f f i c i a l s  know what t o  do i n  case of emergency, and exper ience  
has shown t h a t  e x e r c i s i n g  i s  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  way of p r o v i d i n g  t h i s  knowledge. 
Other c i  v i  1  defense t r a i n i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l 1  inc lge- i -n-creas ing capabi 1  i t i  t o  
p rov i de  s u r v i u a l  in- format ion t o  t h e  pub1 i c  d u r i n g  _a.garj4-d_Z=ek-e-1.oping-~-cisis, 
s t a r t i n g  t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  area of s h e l t e r  management, and a c c e l e r a t i n g  t r a i n i n g  
of rad io1  o g i c a l  defense personnel  . 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  FY 1983 request p rov ides  f o r  a  r ea l  i n c rease  i n  match ing- fund 
suppor t  f o r  t h e  S t a t e  and 1  ocal  c i v i  1  preparedness s t r u c t u r e .  Th is  would pe rm i t  
new j u r i s d i c t i o n s  t o  e n t e r  t he  program, and a d d i t i o n a l  personnel  t o  be suppor ted 
i n  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  now p a r t i c i p a t i n g .  Th is  w i l l ,  i n  t u r n ,  improve c a p a b i l i t i e s  f o r  
management o f  bo th  peacetime and a t t a c k  emergencies. 
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE October 1, 1981 
CIVIL DEFENSE: 
The SPEAXER pro tempore. Under 
a previous order of the House. the gen- 
tleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is 
recognized for 60 minutes. 
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker. I have 
often taken the floor of this House to 
talk on the subject of civil defense, in 
offering amendments to authorization 
and appropriation legislation and a t  
other times during general debate 
when the subject of civil defense 
arose. 
I have asked for this special order 
today because I believe it necessary 
once again that the Members of this 
body have the opportunity to express 
their support for this vital program. 
.this program of civiI defense. I want to 
thank my colleagues who are here 
today to join in this effort. 
To begin this discw&on. Mr. Speak- 
er, it would be appropriate to review 
what has happened to civil defense 
and the civil defense program in 
recent years. both in terms of legisla- 
tive action here in Congress and 
within the various administrations. In 
September,' 1978, then President 
Carter issued Presidential ' Directive 
PD-41 which directed that the  Na- 
tion's civil defense p r o m  should en- 
hance the survivability of the Amerl- 
can population and their leadersfrip. 
thus enhancing deterrence and stabil- 
ity and reducing the possibility of 
Soviet coercion during a time of crisis. 
PD41, Presidential Decision 41, also 
contemplated a "dual use" civil de- 
fense to help deal with peacetime dis- 
asters and emergencies. 
In September of 1979 the House 
passed my amendment to the Depart- 
ment of Defense authorization bill 
that embodied the thrust of Presiden- 
tial Decision 41. I t  set out the goals 
and elements that were to be included 
in an enhanced civil defense program, 
authorized a 5-year program and, most 
importantly, it stated that civil de- 
fense would be considered part of the 
U.S. strategic defense. Unfortunately. 
this amendment died tn the confer- 
ence committee that year in 1979. 
In 1980 we renewed this effort and 
we were successful in a similar amend- 
ment, minus the 5-year authorization. 
It  was adoped by both Houses of Con- 
gress. It was signed into law by the 
President. Thus, the House, the 
Senate, and the administr.^tion went 
on record in support of an enhanced 
civil defense program. 
This year we fared just as  well 
during the authorization process. The 
Houze in the Department of Defense 
authorization bill approved $174 mil- 
lion for fiscal year 1982, an increase of 
$41.2 million over the administration's 
request. 
This was an endorsement of the 
House Armed Senlces Committee 
judgment that this level of funding is 
needed to implement the D-prime pro- 
gram, a 7-year funding effort to im- 
prove population surpival in the event 
of nuclear war, thereby enhancing de- 
terrence and crisis stability. 
Unfortunately, we have not met 
with equal success in the appropri- 
ation process over this same period. 
Our attempts to get adequate funding 
for the citll defense prograxn have 
been frustrated at  every turn. In the 
decade prior to the fiscal year 1981 a p  
propriation, we saw the resources allo- 
cate& for civil defense decline steadily. 
Last year. we did manage a real in- 
crease of 10 percent over the fiscal 
year 1980 level. Although this fiscal 
year 1981 fuixiing of $123 million was 
far less than the $167 million needed 
to begin D-prime last year, a number 
of us were encouraged. We thought 
that a t  least we had turned the comer 
and could build on the initiatives per- 
mitted by this increase, move toward 
ful l  implementation of PD-41, and 
have a truly nationwide, comprehen- 
sive civil defense program. 
Needless to say, our hopes have not 
been fulfilled by what has happened 
so far this year on ciW defense fund- 
ing. The =-independent agencies 
appropriatlon bill for fiscal year 1982 
funds civil defense at  $128.8 million, 
an amount that is even below the 
$132.8 million requested in the origi- 
nal Carter budget, and endorsed by 
the Reagan administration. We have 
been told that the new administration 
has endorsed PD-41. but so far this ad- 
ministration. like its predecessor, has 
not joined the fight to secure funding 
that !s sufficient to make the lofty 
goals of that document a reality. 
G( 
If given a chance, civil defense will 
work. I t  will save lives both during nu- 
clear war and natural disaster. An en- 
hanced US. civil defense program will 
serve to restore a measure of the stra- 
tegic ba.lance of power with the Soviet 
Union which has an active, well 
funded. and by all accounts a workable 
civil defense program. Moreover, an 
enhanced civil defense p r o m  is af- 
fordable, even with today's tight bud- 
gets. There can be no greater priority 
for spending tax dollars than to spend 
them on a program that will save the 
lives of US. citizens. The total cost of 
the 7-year D-prime program would be 
a modest 32.3 billion. The 5-year ver- 
sion of the plan, known a s  the D pro- 
gram. would cost around $2 billion. In 
either case, it is a small price to pay 
for the lives that would be saved. 
Mr. Speaker, there is support for an 
enhanced civil defense program here 
in Congress and among the population 
as  a  hole. The number of Members 
participating in this special order re- 
flects that fact. In addition, on this 
floor on July 17, the chairman of the 
House Appropr~ations Subcommittee 
on --Independent Agencies, Mr. 
BOLAND, told me in a colloquy concern- 
ing the D and D-prime programs, "I 
would be willing to fund a program at 
that level over that period if it has the 
administration's support. If we are 
going to put into place a civiJ defense 
program that is going to protect the 
people of the United States, not only 
in time of war but also against natural 
disasters, this type of program is nec- 
essary ." 
We have much to do, h4r. Speaker. 
and out time is m g  short. We 
must begin an enhanced civil defense 
program soon, and we must deal with 
the related areas of command, control. 
and communications. early warning 
systems, air defense, and ballistic mis- 
sile defense. The time for study and 
reevaluation is over. The time for 
action is now. 
Mr. MITCXELL of New York Mr. 
Speaker, will be gentleman yield? 
Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend, 
the gentleman from NEW York (Mr. 
MITCHELL). 
Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I 
thank the gentleman for yielding. 
Mr. Speaker. I wish to commend my 
good friend and colleague, the gentle- 
man from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) on 
his holding of this special order on 
civil defense. He has been a long and 
strong supporter of an improved civil 
defense program for our Nation. 
It is my belief one of the most press- 
ing and unmet needs facing our Nation 
is for an adequate civil defense pro- 
---one which is responsive to ex- 
isting threats and prepares us for 
future challenges. 
To respond to this need. I proposed 
a comprehensive, 7-year civil defense 
program. Its cost of approximately 
$2.6 billion, represents but a fraction 
of our estimated tot,al, defense expend- 
itm*s for the period covered-the fn- 
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crease in fnnding over our present pro- Most experts agree we eRjoy "rough 
amounts to approximately one- equivalence" with the Soviets in weap 
tenth of 1 percent of our Department Onrp. F'mm my perspective it  appears 
of Defense annual budget. to get mugher each gear. But if Soviet 
The p r o m  I am advancing is one weapons have a far greater destructive 
that will give us. for the first time in effect on us than our weapons on 
t b  nuclear era. the protection we them. it  is as though they had far 
must be assured of as we face our ideo- more weapons. This makes 2 mockery 
logical adversaries who lack our corn- of the strategic balance. I t  does not 
mitment for the pursuit of peace, exist. 
Simply put. my goal is to help to bal- Once the balance of tenor is gone 
ance the strategic scales but, if there the Soviets have an awesome edge in 
should be a war, to guarantee the sur- any confrontation, whether it be at 
viva1 of our Nation. We have no such the bargaining table, an act of adven- 
guarantee today. It is  time we d i d  turism in Europe. Africa. the Mideast 
The 7-year plan would concentrate or in all-out nuclear war. 
the use of the funds requested for: I t  hss been said that “eternal vigi- 
Crisis evacuation: research and devel- lanco is the of liberby." Euenh in 
opment: emergency operating centers. Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan 
training and education: a d  manage- have shown tha& to be true, If Rus ia  
ment and coordination. is able to grab up one or two more 
In each one of these crittcal areas countries, w e  may b e  forced into war- 
our present civil defense program fails with a strong possibility that the 
the test of adequacy. flict could develop into a nuclear con- 
This p r o m  was not developed by frontation. Why not provide at least 
me. rather i t  emerged ov'er an ex- minimal protection for our civilians? 
tended period of time after protrscted Why not teach them to survive? 
study by d~l l  defense experts who Why have we not done someWling 
have earned respect and a rtgtional about civil defense? Chiefly because 
reputation for their w r k  in this area far too many Americans are the vlc- 
I t  is a product of serious. well-inten- tims of three mk.conceptions--the first 
tioned people r h o  share a cancern being the overkill fallacy, wherein the 
about our present. have learned from casualties per kiloton in Hiroshima 
lessons of the past and are determined and Nagasaki are multiplied by the 
to prepare us to live in peaee. I t  is the number of kilotons in the world's arse- 
p r o m  D-prhne recommendation of nal. This implies that by some means 
the civil defense wori;shops which we can collect the entire target popu- 
were held in Rosslyn. Va. in the tall lations in the same density as existed 
of 1977 by the Systems Planning Cor- in HiroshimP aab Nagasskt and keep 
poratfon for the Defense Clvil Prcpar- them unwamed and vnlnersble. A 
edness Agency. statement of identical validity is that 
We are in trouble. ~hesov- fe t s  lrave the world's inventory of snail arms 
an excellent civil defense system. We ammunition, or for that matter, kitch- 
do nut. Neither nation had an ade- e n  knives. can also kill the human pog- 
quate program in the midsixties But ulation several times over. 
for more than a decade the Soviets Another widely held misconception 
have been spending over $1 btllion a is that much of the world's population 
year on civil defense. We have aver- would be destroyed by-fallout fmm a 
aged less than $100 million. They have l-sde nudear war. "On the 
a three-track program: Individual prs- Beach" reflects how this t M g  
cemion. communitg shelters, and p o g  o r i g h & d  The Naaional Academy of 
utation evacuation W e  have only one. Science e s t h a k s  that the long-term 
community shelters, and it is in disar- effect of this fallout would only 
ray in spite of the dedicated and amount to a 2-perewt increase in t he  
dogged efforts of rmury professional cancer rate over a S y e a r  period, This 
and amateur civil defense leaders. increase could be countered by not re- 
Why fs this a problem? Because it building many of the cigarette plants 
destroys the strategic balance. The that would be destroyed in such a hol- 
best hope far peace, w e  are told, is the ocaust. 
maintenance of' the strategic bdance. Pinally. victims of the doomsday sce- 
There are varying estimates on the nario feel. mistakenly, that survivors 
effect of an all-out nuclear war. If the a f  a &ge-aak nuclear war woad 
Soviets have time to put their civil de- W e  tcs Eve und- for weeks at 
fense program intc~ operatiorb4 o r  4 a tirme. Not so, our scientists tell us, 
days prior to the holocaustthe re- An individual can protect himseU from 
sults would be far more destructive tc the most dangerous type of radiation 
the United States, W c h  does not because it travels like light. in a 
have a P ~ - - - o w ~  100 W o n  dead- straight Line. A -ef. folded 
than the Soviet Union-5 to 20 milli4n aver six or eight tima can m e  ru m 
We& ShoaM. w e  adopt the I3-prime effective gas mask to provide pwfer?. 
Plan of the lnteragencp St- an Civil tfonfmnr the less dangerous type of 
Defense, developed under the  aegis of rsdiation 
the National Security Council. they es- That is the bad news. The good news 
timate we can save up to 85 percent of is i t  is not too late do something about 
our population. Should the  Soviets it, A relatively inuruensive remedy is 
target populatian. they estfmate up to to dwelop a civil defense system af 
txxk4hird.s of our population_ will be our oam. Some: of our defense leaders 
preserved. suggest the way to cornpensae for 
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Soviet superiority-they M longer 
claim it does not exist-is to retarget 
our weapons. Retargeting would sup- 
posedly balance through civil de- 
f e n s e t h e  potential saving of Ameri- 
can lives rather than the potential de- 
struction of Soviet citizens 
We must begin today to rebalance 
the strategic equation. How do you 
deter an attack unless you can con- 
vince an enemy that  you will win the 
war that  he is sbrtln(L? I find it  doubt- 
ful that anyone aware to the strategic 
imba.Lance belleves we would fire any 
nucIear weapons if it meant t b  de- 
struction of our society. Without a 
cinl defense system that is precisely 
what It means. 
v y .  this $2.6 billion grogram 
requves the authorization of the Fed- 
eral Emergency Management Agenc;' 
to increase from $174 minion 
in I282 to $487 million in 1988. 
- 
For the Ffrst time ever the Ecme 
Anned Skrvhs Snbcammittee on Mili- 
tary bstahtioas designated D-prime 
as the desired program for civil de- 
fense in the United States. The $17.1 
million authorized for 1982 represents 
the frst yesis  cost of this 7-year com- 
prehensive program. 
The committee language is an fol- 
lows: 
The level of funding in the authorization 
of appropriations in subsection (a1 repre- 
sents Lbe first year of a comprehensive 7- 
year u p w e d  funding program for civil de- 
f- b t Y W l l  aS the D-prhne Which 
f s b s s e d u ~ t h e ~ o f s e h f ~ s c o m -  
m e s f P e  populrrti0~ relocsticnr ~ i l i t p  
for  time of crisis The mmun o r k m a k i  in 
executive branch studies in the dvil defense 
area that provided the basis for Presidentfal 
directive 41. issued in September 1978. and 
is consistent with the action of Cmgress In 
enacting title V of the Federal Court De- 
fense Act of 1950 in Public Law 96-342 
The Congress of the United States 
will spend approximately $225 billion 
for our offensive capability. Without 
the $174 million for civil defense we 
are doing almost nothing to protect 
American citiz* 
Does it  not make good sense to 
spend a little more to  provide a plan 
that would help prevent wax. but in 
the event. of war, would help protect 
all Americans? 
I urge my colleagues to join me in 
helping to implement the D-prime pro- 
gram. Our totai nation& defense de- 
mands no less 
U 1746 
Mr. 0BEBSTA.R. Mr. Speaker, will 
the gentleman yield? 
Mr- SICELTON. I yield. 
Mr. OBEBSTAR. Mr. Speaker. I 
Would like to commend the gentle- 
frem Missoarl for taking this special 
order on the  vital issue of civil de- 
fense. and cangratulate him and the 
gentleman from New Yorh (Mr. 
M m x m ~ )  for the contribution both 
of them made as recognized national 
leafiers la alerting this country t o  the 
need of rebuilding civil defense. and 
fighting on the House floor for im- 
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proved funding for the civil defense ef- 
forts. 
I have supported their efforts in the 
past and will continue to support them 
in the future. I hope all of our col- 
leagues will pay close attention to the 
very substantial information that is 
being presented here in the course of 
this s~ecial  order. 
Mr.'S?XELTON. I thank the gentle- 
man from hlmnesota very much. 
Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, will the 
gentleman yield7 
Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend 
from Maryland. 
(Mr. DYSON asked and was given 
permission to revise and extend h s  re- 
- r r l r r  \ 
clear war is winnable and that should 
be a sobering thought for all of us. 
I am committed, as I believe this 
Congress is, to the restoration of this 
Nation's military posture. However, I 
believe, as does my colleague from 
Missouri, that an intricate element in 
our overall strategic strength lies in a 
no-nonsense "emergency preparedness 
program. 
I would therefore urge both my col- 
leagues in the House and the adminis- 
tration to continue the progress made 
to date in the civil defense of the 
United States. 
Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentle- 
man from Maryland for his remarks. 
He has been a strong supporter of civil 
u k a 1 u . /  
Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, I would defense since he has been in Congress. 
like to take this opportunity today to I thank him for his contribution 
&-.aa.. 
applaud my distinguished colleague's 
efforts on behalf of a strong home de- 
fense for the United States. Let me 
join him in requesting from the Presi- 
dent the continued commitment he 
and his party have made for an effec- 
tive civil defense program. 
It is my concern, however, that per- 
haps during our current budget diffi- 
culties, the administration, with the 
consent of the Congress. will make 
!his country's emergency preparedness 
a casualty of the budget ax. 
For fiscal year 1982, the budget for 
the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency is $128.8 million, which trans- 
lates into 57 cents per capita that this 
Government is spending to protect the 
life and property of the American 
people from nuclear attack and assist 
them during times of natural and 
manmade disasters. 
I realize that this subject is one of 
little interest to many of my col- 
leagues and, to some degree, the 
American people who view the ques- 
tion of survivability in a nuclear 
attack impossible. Yet I believe the 
role of a nation's emergency prepared- 
ness has a dual function. The question 
of survivability is essential but also a 
viable and comprehensive program of 
civil defense will clearly demonstrate 
to our adversaries that the  United 
States will yield no strategic advan- 
tage to the Soviet Union or any other 
nation. 
I believe that it is important to again 
remind the Members of this House 
and the American people'that it is not 
the United States which has embarked 
on the most ambitious and aggressive 
civil defense program during peace 
time, but the Soviet Union, and my 
question is, why? 
Studes conducted by our own ex- 
perts show that the Soviets spend 20 
times as much for civil defense as the 
United States-nearly $2 billion annu- 
aily. Why does a nation which cannot 
provide its people with basic consumer 
goods devote substantial resources to 
civil defense? Are they afraid of a U.S. 
sneak attack or is it mere paranoia? 
I would argue that it is neither, but 
rather a calculated element of their 
overall strategic philosophy that nu- 
w u a y  . 
Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, will 
the gentleman yield? 
Mr. SKJ3LTON. I yield to my col- 
league from Georgia. 
(Mr. McDONALD asked and was 
given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.) 
Mr. McDONALD Mr. Speaker, I 
thank the gentleman from Missouri 
for yielding. I would like to applaud 
his havrncr a mecia1 order to review 
and extr~melysimportant opic that, 
unfortunately, our Nation has disre- 
garded for too long. We can see from 
the great interest by the news galleries 
over our heads, that is symptomatic of 
the problems that we face, that for 
whatever reason, the news media of 
this country have been active propo- 
nents by its sense of omission or com- 
mission of the MAD policy of mutual 
assured destruction. 
Mr. McDONALD. Mr.-Speaker, the 
subject of civil defense looms larger 
each day and becomes important with 
each passing hour as the United States 
moves into "the window of vulnerabil- 
ity" to our strategic forces. Our only 
hope to change the pathetic situation 
as regards to civil defense in this coun- 
try, is to change the basic public atti- 
tude that has been built up by our 
opinion makers that we are in for 
mutual assured destruction and that 
no one will survive, so why even dis- 
cuss it. This attitude is the grossest 
nonsense of all time. The United 
States has to survive and continue if 
civilization, as we know it, is to contin- 
ue. Can we expect the athiest Marxists 
with their 100-percent materialism to 
preserve civilization if they prevail or 
will they turn the  entire Earth planet 
into one vast Gulag? I think we all 
know the answer to that- 
The theory of mutual assured de- 
struction has done more than cripple 
our civil defense. It has amost crippled 
our national yill to survive. I t  has con: 
vinced the man in the street that 
there is no use in civil defense as each 
side has enough bombs to kill each 
other 10 times over anyway. MAD has 
further, and insidiously in my view, 
prevented our Nation from having a 
real strategic goal in m y  future con- 
flict with the Soviet Union in that it 
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assumes an awesome exchange of 
weapons followed by little else than 
just clouds of radiation. 
Before every new conflict, we are 
told that weapons are so awful that 
the war will last not longer than a few 
days or weeks. The invention of the 
machine gun was supposed to make 
World War 1 very short. I t  did not, as 
armies learned to dig in deeply. World 
War II was supposed to be very short 
as the invention of the bomber plane 
would make it impossible to fight 
longer than a few weeks. Now, of 
course, we talk of the 3-week war or 
even in shorter terms because of nu- 
clear weapons. 
It  is a strange thing that we do not 
find talk of mutual assured destmc- 
tion emanating from Moscow. What 
we do find is that the defense hierar- 
chy of Moscow talks of fighting and 
winning a nuclear war. We also find a 
vast system of civil defense that is 
building factories out in the country, 
has deep shelters in its cities, spends 
several billions on training civil de- 
fense personnel and plans to evacuate 
as many people as it can. Could it be 
that the Soviet Government values its 
citizens more that we do? The People's 
Republic of China also has a vast shel- 
ter system to protect its people and, 
obviously, intends to try and survive a 
nuclear Strike. And, while neither the 
Soviet nor the Communist Chinese 
civil defense systems are perfect, they 
will be able to save a lot of people and 
much of their industrial capacity in 
any nuclear exhange. 
As in the case of the infantw in 
World War I, we need to dig deeply 
into the earth and let that be our 
a m o u r  against a nuclear attact, We, 
too, need a shelter system, an evacua- 
tion plan, and a system to protect our 
industrial capacity. For a few hundred 
million dollars, we could start a serious 
civil defense program, start training 
the necessary personnel and start 
taking the steps necessary to our Na- 
tion's sunival and abandon the MAD 
doctrine which can only lead to our 
Nation's destruction and/or surrender. 
Otherwise, we are doomed to live in 
the valley of the shadow for the next 
5 years at  least, our very existence de- 
pendent upon the whims fo the Polit- 
buro in Moscow. 
Mr. Speaker, let me once again com- 
mend my colleague from Missouri for 
this most important special order on 
the subject of civil defense. 
Mr. SKIELTON. I thank my friend 
and colleague from Georgia f o r p i s  
contribution today. 
Mr. BRINECLCI. Mr. Speaker, will 
the gentleman yield? 
Mr. SF;ELTON. I yield to my-friend 
and colleague from Georgia. 
Mr. BRINECLCI. Mi. Speaker, I 
thank the gentleman very much. If 
the roll is called of civil defense and 
civil defense issues, the name of the 
gentleman from Missouri would head 
the list in terms of those who have 
made such a fine contribution to the 
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remedial legislation designed in the in- 
terests of the American citizen in time 
of war. Following Mr. S~ELTON'S name 
certainly would be the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. MrrCKELL). Mr. 
WHITE~JRST of Virginia, Mr. DICKIN- 
SON of Alabama, and many others of 
us who have felt for a long time that 
civil defense has been neglected. 
Mr. MITC- of New York. Mr. 
Speaker, will the gentleman yield? 
Kr. BRINKUZ. Of course. 
Mr. MITCHELt of New York. I 
would just like to add that very nearly 
at the top of that list would be the 
gentleman from Georgia because of 
the splendid job he has done not only 
to develop the civil defense system. 
but in the leadership he has provided 
as chairman of the subcommittee that 
has jurisdiction over this subject. 
Mr. BRINKLEY. I thank my friend 
and fellow pilot from the State of New 
York. 
Where I am coming from is just a 
tad different. The Whiteman Air 
Force Base. I believe, you have Instru- 
ments of war there that would be tar- 
geted by the Soviet Union; is that not 
correct? 
Mr. SICELTON. That is absolutely 
correct. We have 150 ICBM misslle 
sllos that are at or in the Fourth Con- 
gresslonal District of Missouri that I 
represent. The gentleman is correct. 
Mr. BRINIZLFY. If I recall correct- 
ly, in the gentleman's district in the 
recent paat. -there has been severe 
flooding which we would term as a 
natural disaster. 
Mr. SKELTON. Yes, we had-and of 
course I have told the gentleman of 
these because of his interest in the 
dual use of civil defense--we had a 
killer flood in the western part of my 
district, the Fourth District of Missou- 
ri, and we have had killer tornados on 
two occasions in which civil defense 
played a very important part. 
Mr. BRINRLGI. And ttus brings me 
to the structure of which I speak. 
which is one of dual use which would 
provide a future in-place system of 
civil defense that would be tested and 
exercised by the Vikings. the Ber- 
serkers--the natural disasters that do 
certainly come along from time to 
time, which would provide us an ade- 
quate preparedness on which we could 
depend should that dire day ever 
come. 
0 1750 - ' 
So I have been something of a mis- 
sionary. I have preached the gospel of 
dual use. not only because of the cer- 
tainty of natural disasters but because 
it would give us some self-confidence 
in our attack preparedness. 
I also believe. Mr. Speaker, it would 
provide an important peacetime divi- 
dend, a cost-effective mechanism that 
would give us more bang for the buck. 
I t  would give us two for the price of 
one. If we are getting the utility of 
civil defense in peacetime, we also 
have it standing in the wings for a 
time of war. 
I think that success is a matter of Mr. SECGLTON. Mr. Chsirman, I 
mafafns. I think that that capability thank the gentleman from Georgia 
which better Prepares itself just a (Mr. BRINKLEY), and I do appreciate 
little bit more in a state of readiness the gentleman's participating in our 
would stand it in good stead in the s~ecial  order this evening. 
event of war. 
So I do speak for a dual use System. 
and I would say to the Members of the 
Eouse that our subcommittee has at 
this time grafted in the defense au- 
t h o e t i o n  bill language which does 
bring natural disaster preparedness up 
to the same status, as a matter of stat- 
utory law, as that in the civil defense 
system. We are in conference right 
now, but we are trusting that that wi l l  
become a matter of law and that this 
will  be helpful to our civil defense 
system because of the fact that it 
serves as a powerful incentive. I t  
would motlvate our local and State 
people who are .charged with the 
needs of a natural disaster situation. it 
would encouarage them to do their 
job. and then we would have them in 
place in the event the attack disaster 
would come along. 
Finally, Mr. Speaker. I might men- 
tion the item which the last speaker 
referred to, and that is the doctrine of 
mutual assured destruction (MAD). I t  
has been said that the Soviet Union 
has sufficient firepower to kill every 
human being on Earth and that we in 
the United States have sufficient fire- 
power to kill every human being o n  
Earth. Why is it, then. that we corn- 
Pete more and more in this anns nrce 
in which we are engaged? 
Well. that is not exactly right. Those 
Rresumptions, those beliefs, would pre- 
sume that on bombing day all the 
people of the world would go into the 
cities to which that firepower is tar- 
geted. The Soviet Union has different 
plans. I t  has a dispersal system which 
would take the people away from the 
Population centers and thus save the 
lives of millions. That is the goal 
toward which the gentreman from 
New York (Mr. MXTCEELL) has pointed. 
If we should go to r continental 
system such as the prime or the 
followon, it would serve the American 
people well because we would disperse 
the people and we would save millions. 
countless millions of lives. 
Finally, in conclusion. I am going to 
explore with our subcommittee the ad- 
dition of language whichwould permit 
the President to institute a volunteer 
system with reference to State and 
local governments under the authority 
of the Federal civil defense umbrella 
which might come into play and trig- 
ger the energies of national groups 
chartered by the Federal Government. 
I am speaking of those charters held 
by veterans' groups. Gold Star Wives, 
and others who might be an important 
backup in any dispersal-system that 
we might have. 
Once again, Mr. Speaker, I thank 
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
SKEZTON) for taking this time to em- 
phasize the importance of civil defense 
and the fact that it is time that we 
"fish or cut bait." 
-The gentleman from- Georgia has 
shown extraordinary leadership as 
chairman of the subcommittee in as- 
sisting civil defense, and he has in all 
meanings of the word been the "father 
of dual usen--dual use of civil defense, 
including natural disasters, along with 
the protection against nuclear attack. 
The gentleman from Georgia should 
certainly be thanked for the hard 
work he has done in this area 
Mr. gRAMER. Mr. Speaker, will  the 
gentleman yield? 
Mr. SICELTON. I yield to my friend. 
the gentleman from Colorado. 
Mr. gRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank 
the gentleman for yielding. 
Let me first begin by saylng how 
much I personally appreciate-and I 
am, hopefully. speaking on behalf of 
the people of the congressional district 
of which I have the privilege to be the 
Represertative, the Mfth Congression- 
al District of Colorado-and how much 
we appreciate the work of the gentle- 
man from Missouri (Mr. S~ELTON). the 
work of the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. MITCRELL), and the work and ef- 
forts of our distinguished subcommit- 
tee chairman, the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. BBIXKLEY) in bringing to 
the followu~ stage this most critical 
and vital issue. 
The MAD doctrinemutual assured 
desttuction-under which this country 
has operated its strategic umbrella 
now for almost two decades is, in my 
judgment. a dixredited policy. I t  is 
one by which the acronym. MAD, 
truly and very characteristically iden- 
tifies the significance of this policy, 
because it is a policy that emphasizes 
the disprotection of the American 
homeland and the American people. I t  
is a policy that in effect holds Ameri- 
can POpulatiOns ap unwitting pawns in 
a game of strategic balance and coun- 
terbalance. I t  pur~osely puts the 
American population at risk; because 
it says that to be able to protect your- 
self and your citizens is somehow de- 
stabilizing or is somehow go- to 
upset potentially the other side. 
Thus it has come about that we have 
no protection against incoming hostile 
bombers, we have no protection 
aealnst incoming hostile missiles, and 
we have no way today of which I am 
aware of protecting the American 
people in the event that some calami- 
tous or purposeful or inadvertent 
event is somehow triggered. 
Since the gentleman has brought 
these matters to our attention during 
the course of our subcommittee meet- 
ings. I have often since reflected and 
wondered, what would happen if an 
American President faced a crisis of 
this kind. As I understand it. it would 
take about 4 days for the Soviets to 
fully implement the Soviet civil de- 
fense policy. What would an American 
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President do at a time when a crisis to the attention of the American lars a year to keep alive chronically ill 
arose between us and the .Soviet people. people. Here is a society which be- 
Union, when tensions were running Mr. SKZLTON. I the gentle- lieves in setting up kidney treatment 
man vem much. I appreciate the gen- centers at a cost of over $1 billion a 
tlemsn from Colorado's continued and year. 
high, if the Soviet Government imple 
mented its civil defense policy 1 day at 
a time, knowing that if that policy 
were successfully implemented, the 
potential exists, as I understand the 
figures, that if an exchange were then 
to Lake place between us and the 
Soviet Union, the United States would 
lose upward to 150 million people from 
its population and the Soviets, al- 
though they would suffer a tremen- 
dous loss, could nevertheless minimize 
that loss to about 15 million, less than 
the number that was lost by the Sovl- 
ets in World War XI?  
With those kinds of mtios staring an 
American President in the face and 
with a Soviet ultimatum then follow- 
ing, what action would an American 
President take? 
Would he capitulate to Soviet de- 
mands, or would he have the capabili- 
ty of resisting? 
Quite frankly, if I were an American 
President in that situation I do not 
know what I would do, and I hope that 
no American President is ever put in 
that situation. 
But until we pay attention to the ca- 
pability of reversing the discredited 
doctrine of MAD and turning to the 
defense of the American homeland 
and the American people, that risk is 
one that we run against a very danger- 
ous time fuse and a very dangerous 
time clock. And our '  mbcommfttee 
chairman has. I think. put it very art- 
fully in terms of the statement. that 
the "time is now to fish or cut bait." 
Many have stated, "Well, the Ameri- 
can people really don't mre about civil 
defense. It is not an issue." Well, we 
can tell, I think, from the news atten- 
tion that this matter is getting that it 
is not an Issue. But I would submit 
that it is not , an issue because the 
American people, as we sit here in this 
room. honestly believe that they do 
have a capability of protecting them- 
selves, and the gentleman is doing a 
marvelous job of educating them so 
that they no longer believe that. 
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They do have a civil defense pro- 
gram that is capable of defending 
American populations, and that is the 
reason that so little excitement seems 
to be generated over the issue. 
I really truly believe that the gentle 
man from Mtssouri (Mr. -#) 
does us a real service by educating us, 
by laying out these cold, bleak, hard 
facts as to just what great risks there 
are if we continue on this policy. 
We can no longer continue to be 
solely an offensive country. building 
weapons that are capable of destroy- 
ing people without.some consideration 
of protecting ourselves and our people 
against those same weapons or types 
of weapons being directed against us. .. 
I am privileged to be a part of this 
special order and again I commend the 
gentleman for bringing this vital issue 
very helpful support in the area of 
civil defense. The gentleman has been 
so sincere and working hard, and we 
do appreciate the gentleman partici- 
pating today. 
Mr. GINGRICB. Mr. Speaker, wLU 
the gentleman yield? 
Mr. SEELTON. I yield to my friend 
fmm Georgia (Mr. Gmmm). 
Mr. GINGRICH. I thank my friend 
from Missouri for recognizing me. I 
appreciate the gentleman taking the 
leadership to speak today on an issue 
that is only of importance should war 
come, but then is of such Fmportance 
that it should concern aU of us In 
peacetime. 
The question I think every American 
should ask is what is the cost of insur- 
ance and what is it worth to have it. 
I t  is very clear to anyone who has 
looked at any field that the Sovlet 
Union does believe that nuclear war is 
an instrument of political pohcy. I t  ~s 
very clear from anyone who has ever 
studied history that accidents do 
happen, rmstakes are made, political 
leaders do frankly goof. and the net 
result-can be a war no one wanted. 
If we were to invest in civil defense 
on the scale that is reasoned, and le- 
gitimate and necessary, and nothing 
ever happened, we might at most have 
wasted some money. Id we fa i l  to 
invest in civil defense and something 
happens, we wlll  have wasted lives. 
r would far rather be the man who 
faced my grandchfldren and said, yes, 
I was too cautious, yes, .I cared too 
much, Yes. I did too much, than be the 
man who faces the survivors and tries 
to e x p b  why we did not do the 
things that were necessary. 
I t  is clear that the Defense Depart- 
ment looks too narrowly a t  the ques- 
tion of stratemc weapons and strategic 
defense. We are on the verge of de- 
siglllng an MX mtsdle system which 
will guarantee that after an all-out 
Soviet first strike. missiles will survive 
but cities will not. Any reasonable ex- 
amination of the plans for the MX 
mobile basmg system will indicate 
clearly an assumption that it is m i -  
ble that the Soviet Union might one 
day, for reasons of policy, explode 100. 
200, 1,000, 3,000 hydrogen warheads 
on the North American Continent. In 
that environment, the fallout, the ra- 
diation, the downwind effect on the 
Midwest, on Chicago, on Detroit. and 
in some drcumstances on Washington. 
would be so phenomenal that the 
impact on human befngs would be so 
incredible that wrstand a chance of 
saving literally millions of human 
beings. 
Here is a society which will 8pend 
over $1 million to keep alive a person 
who has been in a car wreck and 
whose brain has ceased to function. 
Here is a society which will spend lit- 
erally hundreds of thousands of dol- 
Mr. SICELTON. If I may reclaim my 
time for a moment, I know the gentle- 
man would be interested in knowing 
that in the year 1977 and the year 
1978 .the U.S. Government, through 
the .U.S. Atr Force, spent $124 million 
to harden 150 ICBM silos in western 
Missouri, in my district. the Fourth 
District of Missouri. 
During that same year, less than 
$100 million was spent to protect the 
people of this Nation from the very 
same eventualfty that they spent $124 
million to harden those silos. I t  is 
rather ironic. That is exactly what the 
gentleman is saying. And I yield to 
him again. 
Mr. GINGRICH. I thank my col- 
league for enlightening me. I had no 
idea of those numbers and I think the 
gentleman is right. We harden mis- 
siles, but we do not harden human 
beings. We protect control centers but 
we do not protect people. 
There is probably no single cause in 
terms of the amount of attention it 
does not get that deserves more atten- 
tion, more investment, more thought. 
and more commitment than the cause 
of civil defense. 
I challenge the Reagan administra- 
tion and I believe this Congress will ul- 
timately join in challengipg the 
Reagan administration to build a pro- 
human, prosurvival, propopulation, 
strategic policy that is the equal to its 
weaponry, its hardware, and its strate- 
gic offensive policy, because if we look 
at the real world it is inconceivable to 
me, as I am sure it is inconceivable to 
my colleague, that any President 
would use any kind of strategy or.&- 
plomacy knowing that a Soviet first 
strike, even if it allowed the MX to 
survive, would, in the process, have 
killed literally millions of Americans 
from fallout, not from the  blast. not 
from the immediate effect, but from 
the careless, wanton lack of prepara- 
tion on the part of our Government 
and its leaders. 
I simply want to close by saying 
again to my colleagues, I know that it 
is a long and lonely vigil. I know the 
gentleman and the dean of the Geor- 
gia delegation have led the fight. I 
want to commend both of you because 
I tb.ink literally there may be in our 
lifetime no single cause that saves 
more American lives than the cause of 
civil defense that the two of you have 
so eloquently espoused. I thank the 
gentlemen. 
Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentle- 
man for his very appropriate com- 
ments. 
The gentleman reminds me that 
during the 1930's. beginntng about 
1934, there was a Member of Parlia- 
ment in the United gingdom that 
spoke of a great danger across the 
English Channel, and that great 
October 1, 1981 
danger and the great new fact. of 
which this Member of. Parliament 
spoke was the fact that Germany was 
building a tremendous air fleet. Few 
paid attention. Few paid attention to 
him until about 1938, and pe6ple did 
begin to pay attention to Winston 
Churchill. They did begin to build 
Hurricane fighters and Spitfire fight- 
ers. 
But what is more important, they 
began to make preparation for the use 
of the tunnel system, the subway 
system of London. should the e-ventu: 
ality ever come to pass that London 
were bombed, and thank goodness he 
was heeded. 
He was heeded. and because of that 
literally thousands of British people 
are alive today because they had that 
protection, not just from the intercep 
tors that were built, but by the use. 
the proper use of those tunnels, and 
the proper use of the subways in 
London. 
Mr. Speaker. a number of our col- 
leagues have spoken today and ex- 
pressed. as I have attempted to, the 
sincere desire to have a strong civil de- 
fense for our Nation. I represent the 
4th Congressional District of Missouri. 
In that district is Whiteman Air Force 
Base, which is the control center of 
150 ICBM missiles, Minutemen II mis- 
siles. These missiles, as we all know, 
are targets of Soviet missiles should 
the unthinkable come to pass. 
I want the people of western MLssou- 
ri to be safe, But there are other 
Whiteman Air Force Bases in this 
Nation and ,there are other missile 
fields in this Nation; there are other 
strategic airfields and there are other 
strategic submarine bases, some 39 
strategic first-strike areas that we 
think would be targeted first. The 
people that live in those areas, as well 
as the people that live in our cities -and 
towns all across our Nation. deserve 
Protection should the unthinkable 
come to pass. 
Let it not be too late. 
Mr. Speaker. I intend to presevere. 
Mr. Speaker. I intend that we eventu- 
ally have a strong civil defense pro- 
gtam that is properly funded and one 
that we in America can be proud of 
and one that will be part in t ~ t h  and 
fact of our strategic defense. 
With the help of the Members of 
this body we will have such a civil de- 
fense in the days ahead. 
I=. F'LIPPO. Mr Speaker I would 
like to associate myself with the re- 
marks that have been made by my col- 
leagues about civil defense. The prob- 
lem with civil defense has been that 
no one ever needs it. no citizen spends 
much time thinking about it, no pres- 
sure groups breath down our necks to 
do something until it is too late-until 
there is a disaster. Only then will our 
constituents turn to us and say, with 
justification: "Why didn't you plan for 
this?" 
There is nothing politically expedi- 
ent or glamorous about civil defense; 
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only the mundane, long-haul planning 
that all of us pray we will never nee& 
Congress can be proud that in the 
last few years we have made a start in 
plannlng for national emergencies. We 
have done our homework and found 
that civil defense has more uses than 
we thought. Not orily will an effective 
plan provide stability during time of 
crisis and enhance our survivability, 
but the mere promise of stability and 
survivability provides a deterrent to 
our patential enemies and a powerful 
psychological weapon in our arsenal. 
A strong civil defense network can 
be efficiently adapted to natural dis- 
asters so that we can marshal1 our re- 
sources to provide a coordinated re- 
sponse for floods, hurricanes, torna- 
dos, blizzards, or nuclear and chemical 
accidents. 
We need to do more in this area. We 
can not afford to postpone our efforts 
to some unspecified future date.. 
Mr. HUGRES. Mr. Speaker, I Fel- 
come this opportunity, offered by my 
distinguished colleague IKE SKELTON, 
to discuss the vital subject of our Na- 
tion's civil defense. 
In the past, when conventional war- 
fare was the sole source of confronta- 
tion between nations, conventional 
means for defending a nation's citizen- 
ry were sufficient. We could hide from 
enemy bombs and bullets using the 
same facilities we would use to hide 
from tornaches or natural disasters in 
this country. In addition, our natural 
geographie~i9alation from our enemies 
provided sufficient disincentive to dis- 
courage our enemies from major 
attack with the exception of the 
bombing of Pearl H~rbor .  
Nuclear weapons and accurate mis- 
sile guidance Systems have changed 
our countries defense needs. Now, we 
can no longer afford to soley concen- 
trate on weaponry designed for attack 
or defense from conventional attack. 
nor can we assume that our most sig- 
nificant enemy, the Sbviet Union, can 
be wholly prevented from penetrating 
our defenses in the case of a nuclear 
conflict. SO, at a time when we are 
spending record amounts on weapons 
systems which we hope will discourage 
the Soviet Union from ever b e w - g  
a conflict, we must also plan for a pos- 
sibility which we fervently hope will 
cever become reality-nuclear attack. 
In the event of a full-scale nuclear 
confrontation between the United 
States and U.S.S.R.. there is onehines- 
capable reality-millions of human 
beings would die and life as we h o w  it 
would be inalterably disrupted. But 
knowing that, we must not forget that 
the tragedy which would befall the 
United States in such an event could 
be significantly mitigated in the event 
O f  an attack hCSllions of Uves could be 
saved at a surprisingly low social cost. 
According to data provided by the 
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency G"EMA), a system of civil de- 
fense which could save approximately 
80 percent of our population from 
death in a nuclear war would cost 
about $2.6 billion over 7 years. or 
about $1.67 per person per year. This 
system, called a "Crisis Relocation 
Pl-" would cost about $1.8 billion 
more than the current civil defense 
system, yet save about 90 million more 
human beings than current capabili- 
ties could. In the words of the FZW.4 
report: "This works out to $20 per life 
saved. which many consider an attrac- 
tively low insurance premium." 
The benefits of such a system 
extend well beyond those in the event 
of nuclear conflict, which we must 
make every conceivable effort to 
avoid. First, such a system could actu- 
ally deter the occurrence of conflict, 
by improving our defense. Second, it 
could reduce the Soviet's powers of co- 
ercion, by reducing a genuine civil de- 
fense gap between the United States 
and U.S.S.R. Third, in the event of 
natural disasters, nuclear powerplant 
incident, or other peacetime emergen- 
cy, a civil defense evacuation plan 
could prove invaluable. 
So let us not be shortsighted as we 
consider means to provide for our Na- 
tion's defense. Although a good of- 
fense may be the best defense, a good 
defense should not be forgotten 
, We cannot forget the need to allevi- 
ate some of the terror of the nuclear 
age. to attempt to prevent the feared 
eventuality, and to save as many 
American lives as possible should the 
leaders of the Soviet Vnion or  oar own 
leaders ever think the unthinkable, 
and plunge us into an irreversably 
tragic confrontation; Let us support 
civil defense.. 
.-Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Speak- 
er. I commend the gentleman from 
Missouri for securing a special order to 
give House Members an additional o g  
portunity to discuss the posture of or 
Nation's civil defense. His concern 
over the possibility that Congress may 
compromise our civil defense capabili- 
ty by reducing its budget commitment 
for this program is to be appreciated. 
Indeed I share fully his commitment 
to maintaining a level of appropri- 
ations adequate to preserving civil de- 
fense as an essentail and integral part 
of our overall national defense policy. 
The civil defense effort should not be 
surrendered or reduced. 
In the process of reviewing and es- 
tablishing defense priorities civil de- 
fense always seems to be the odd man 
out. Offensive hardware attracts at- 
tention away-from the very real need 
to maintain passive defense programs. 
including civil defense. Neither effort 
should take from the other. They 
must be mutually supportive in their 
roles 'of deterring soviet aggression 
and the aggressive acts of other poten- 
tial adversaries. 
The result of this conscious disen- 
chantment with passive defense has 
been the erosion of our civil defense 
posture over a period of years to the 
point where it no longer is a credible 
element within our strategic force 
structure. Civil defense, in my judg- 
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ment, must once again be considered 
in conjunction with our offensive and 
defensive forces if our national secu- 
rity is to be preserved. To erase it from 
our strategic formula is to threaten 
the very mission and purpose of our 
strategic nuclear force; namely the de- 
terrence of nuclear war. 
We no longer have the luxury of as- 
sured force superiority over the Sovi- 
ets. Those days are long behind us and 
it is questionable today whether or not 
a balance of strategic military power- 
often referred to as a "rough equiv- 
alence"--exists. At best, we can say 
that, for the present time, the real 
strength and preparedness of the US. 
strategic Triad remains credible to the 
Soviet Union. However, the future of 
relative United States-Soviet strategic 
balance is cloudy. United States devel- 
opment and deployment of modem 
strategic weapons just are not keeping 
pace with the Soviet Union and our 
defense capability, in the eyes of the 
Soviets. may be waning. 
The facts speak for themselves. To 
understand the extent of our vulner- 
ability to Soviet nuclear attack re- 
quires only a brief review of the rela- 
tive United States-U.S.S.R. strategic 
balance. 
The current US. B-52 bomber force 
will require modernization beyond the 
mounting of cruise missiles. We 
cannot afford continued reductions in 
fleet size for the purpose of cannibal- 
ization of aircraft to keep remaining 
B-52's on line. 
Current land-based ICBM forces will 
become more vulnerable with time as 
Soviet missile accuracy and MIRV ca- 
pability improve. 
The submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) force represents the 
only US. strategic delivery system 
being modernized. Meanwhile, the 
Soviet Union is modernizing a large 
portion of its forces, hardening its 
facilities and continuing its intensive 
research and development. 
Since 1970, according to information 
provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the United States has put into produc- 
tion one variant of an existing inter- 
continental ballistic missile (ICBM), 
one new type of submarine and subma- 
rine-launched ballistic missile system, 
and no new strategic bomber systems. 
In the same period, Soviet efforts to 
improve and enlarge its strategic 
forces have brought them from a Posi- 
tion of clear inferiority to one of supe- 
riority in many measures of capability. 
The Soviets have. modernized the 
ICBM force through new deployment 
modifications to deployed systems 
which have incorporated greater 
throw weight, more reentry vehicles 
per misstle, and increased accuracy. 
T h e  Joint Chiefs of Staff now report 
that the Soviets possess a "clear and 
growing advantage in ability to kill 
hard targets." 
Too, the Soviets continue to diversi- 
f y  and improve other elements of their 
strategic element structure. They con- 
tinue to build modern, nuclear- 
powered ballistic missfle submarines 
more quicgly than the United States. 
new genemtions of longer range sub- 
marine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM) thereby expanding the patrol 
area of the Soviet submarines making 
them and their missiles less accessible 
to U.S. interception. F'urther, while re- 
taining their existing intercontinental 
bomber forces, the Soviets have de- 
ployed over 100 Bacbfire bombers and 
are adding about 30 each year. This 
bomber has sufficient range to be used 
as an intercontinental bomber against 
the United States. 
While the United States can claim 
advantage in state-of-the-art tecMol- 
ogy, technology not employed or de- 
ployed does nothing to improve our 
defense posture. 
These trends, which must be viewed 
with serious concern, have created 
what the President often refers to as 
the "window of vulnerability." The 
very size of that so-called window 
makes survivability a top priority con- 
cern. It  is more than clear that the 
strategic military balance between the 
United States and U.S.S.R. continues 
to shift toward our potential adversary 
in a very big way. Zndeed, the imbal- 
ances are of sucn magnitude measured 
quantitatively and qualitatively as  to 
confront the United States with the 
prospect of facmg such imbalances 
well into the future. Th is  is particular- 
ly true in light of the Soviets willing- 
n w  to continue to invest heavily to 
keep the momentum going in their 
favor. 
The realities of the United States- 
Soviet strategic balance render it es- 
sential that civil defense be main- 
tained as a critical element in our na- 
tional defense structure. The Soviets 
are approaching a first strike capablll- 
ty and the ability of the United States 
to survive such a strike becomes of 
ever-growing importance as a deter- 
rent factor. 
To note now seriously the Soviets 
view civil defense, one has only to look 
a t  their efforts in this regard. To com- 
plement their offensive capabilities, 
the Soviet Union maintains a large 
strategic defense force supplemented 
by what the Joint Chiefs of Staff refer 
to as "an extensive civil defense pro- 
gram," both of which are far superior 
to their US. counterparts. 
We must approach the Soviet level 
of effort for passive defense. including 
civil defense, if our strategic nuclear 
force is to continue to provide a credi- 
ble deterrence to potential Soviet nu- 
clear aggression. Our "window of vul- 
nerability" remains too wide open 
without such an improved civil defense 
posture. We must take into account 
the civil defense'commitment of the 
Soviets and strengthen our own civil 
defense program accordingly ,with the 
purpose of develo~ing plans to be im- 
plemented during times of crisis. 
The magnitude of Soviet civil de- 
fense efforts and capability, when cou- 
pled with high accuracy and more reli- 
able missiles, could adversely affect 
our ability to implement the US. de- 
terrence strategy. 
We have to ownup to the fact that 
the worse case scenario might occur. 
Should it occur in the near future, the 
Soviet Union has a first strike capabil- 
ity of inflicting on currently unpro- 
tected Americans something in the 
order of 1.60 million fatalities. En- 
hanced civil defense efforts providing 
for a greater degree of survivability 
and' continuity of government will 
serve to improve our deterrence pos- 
ture. 
In the interest of world peace, the 
Soviets cannot be permitted to believe 
that their civil defense system will im- 
prove their ability to wage war and en- 
hance Soviet survival of a nuclear ex- 
change. We need, instead, to impress 
upon the Soviets the ability of the 
United States to recover quickly from 
the effects of a nuclear attack, and in 
a condition permitting a US,  retali- 
atory attack of a nature to inflict cata- 
strophic damage to the Sollet Union. 
Currently, our civil defense program 
lacks credibility. and I join my col- 
league and friend in taking this oppor- 
tunity to express my full endorsement 
for maintaming a firm budget commit- 
ment for a strong and viable civil de- 
fense.. 
Mr. LQTT. Mr. Speaker, I certainly 
agree with my colleagues on the floor 
today who are spealung to the impor- 
tance of civil defense as an integral 
,part of our Nation's defense posture. 
We must take caution against any mis- 
conceptions regarding the viability of 
civil defense. 
Over the last 15 years. the Soviets 
have spent almost $2 billion per year 
to const,ruct a comprehensive civil de- 
fense system. This amounts to ap- 
proximately $5 per capita and com- 
pares to our own expenditure of some 
49 cents per capita, most of which is 
earmarked for administrative expendi- 
tures. 
Although estimates regarding the 
capabilities of the U.S.S.R. civil de- 
fense system vary, it is clear that the 
Soviets are making a conscious effort 
to protect their population in the 
event of nuclear war and have includ- 
ed all segments of their society in 
their defense planning. 
The irony of our present situation is 
that the United States -could develop a 
reasonably effective civil defense pro- 
gram given a few well-thought-out 
plans and relatively modest expendi- 
tures of time and money. AU that is 
lacking is a Federal commitment. 
Such a commitment is necessary to 
an effective partnership in civil de- 
fense between local governments and 
'the Pedenl Government to prepare 
our communities and the Nation to 
survive a war. If this; preparation is 
made, these same communities are 
also prepared to survive the common 
natural occurrences of floods, torna- 
does, and hurricanes. 
In view of current international ten- 
sions, the civil defense partnership 
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must be upheld and strengthened. 
Civil defense must once again become 
an integral component in our strategic 
debate.. 
Civil Defensethe New Debate 
The possibility of a newprogram for strengthening the U.S. civll defense against nuclear attack has been raised 
in Washington recently. Because the editors of Worldview believe a public debate on the program would be 
useful, we asked a number of people to respond to one or more of the following questions: 
1 .  Do you understand it to be the policy of the Carter administration to give major priority to civil defense in 
the over-all defense posture of this country? 
2. Would such a direction be a positive or negative factor in t e r m  of (a) American security and (b) reducing 
the chances of nuclear war? Why? 
3. What is drfferent now from the debate over civil defense against nuclear attack that took place in the late 
Fifties and early Sixties? 
4. What are the ethical considerations you believe are relevant to the above questions? 
New Situation, New Response 
Paul H. Nitze 
G eorge Kennan, in an interview published by the New York Times Magazine, 
affirmed the proposition that it is better to be "Red than 
dead." Since the end of World War I1 the United States 
has been engaged in a successful effort to demonstrate 
that the choice thus implied is wrong. We have demon- 
strated, at least to date, that it is not necessary to be 
either "Red or dead"; it has been possible both to 
remain free and to avoid a nuclear war. The essential 
task is to continue so to do. 
In the last half of the 1950's, at the time of Sputnik, 
serious doubts arose as to whether a time would shortly 
arise when that issue-"Red or dead"-could become 
serious. It had not been a serious choice during the 
period when we had a nuclear monopoly, or even when 
we had an overwhelming and stable nuclear deterrent. 
But with the Soviet development of ICBMs, the techno- 
logical practicality of which was first demonstrated by 
Sputnik, it became possible, perhaps probable, that the 
"better Red than dead" issue would arise in all serious- 
ness in a few years. 
The alternative solution originally given most atten- 
tion was the initiation of a U.S. civil defense program. 
The Gaither Committee, a study group appointed by 
President Eisenhower, came to the conclusion that such 
a program could indeed be effective both in enhancing 
deterrence and greatly reducing casualties if deterrence 
were to fail. They also concluded, however, that higher 
priority should be given to immediate measures to 
improve the survivability of our strategic bomber crews 
so that a significant portion could be continuously on 
alert, and by assuring that the alert bombers could get 
off the ground in the time provided by the warning 
system. It was recommended that this be coordinated 
with a program to assure that as soon as possible we 
-- - - 
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deploy ICBMs in dispersed hardened silos and SLBMs 
in hard-to-find submarines at sea. An elaborate civil 
defense program was given second priority. The first 
priority recommendations of the Gaither Committee 
were put into effect. 
The executive branch concurrently initiated a modest 
civil defense program designed to provide warning, iden- 
tify and mark already existing shelter spaces, and 
partially stock them with supplies. New shelter con- 
struction was left to individual initiative. By 1962 we 
had deployed sufficient ICBMs in dispersed and hard- 
ened silos and enough Polaris submarinsbased launch- 
ers to provide assured crisis stability and high-quality 
deterrence. After that time civil defense could be, and 
was viewed as, a low-priority requirement. To many it 
became, unjustifiably, a cause for derision. 
Today the situation has changed; the Soviet Union has 
for a decade or more been devoting far greater effort to 
its strategic offensive capabilities than have we. We cut 
back our program to a third, if measured in cQnstant 
dollars, of what it averaged during the six years from 
1956 to 1962. The Soviet program has expanded to a 
point at which it is now estimated to be triple ours. 
There is now little doubt that our previous nuclear stra- 
tegic superiority has been eliminated. Many, myself 
included, believe we are heading into a period of serious 
strategic inferiority and instability. Authorities in the 
executive branch take a less serious view than I, but they 
too are concerned. The "better Red than dead" or "bet- 
ter dead than Red" dilemma is again a serious concern. 
Under these circumstances the question arises wheth- 
er we should again consider a more active civil defense 
program. The executive branch is putting priority on 
measures to assure the continuing survivability, endur- 
ance, and capability of our ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers. I wish the executive branch were doing even 
more in that direction and had acted earlier. In addition 
the executive branch is reported to be considering 
doubling, or thereabouts, the current civil defense 
program of $90 million a year. In other words, they are 
considering adding to our civil defense program an 
SOURCE : Worldview v.22, ~an/~eb 1979. pp. 40-48" 
Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, with permission of 
copyright claimant. December 1981. I A 
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amount approximating .O1 per cent of our overall 
defense budget. The purpose of this increased civil 
defense spending would be to give the United States in 
the event of a serious crisis the ability to evacuate most 
of our urban population to the countryside. The execu- 
tive branch estimates that there are circumstances, were 
deterrence to fail, in which such measures would enable 
most of our population to survive. The main point, 
however, is that such a capability could add to deter- 
rence and thus help us continue to avoid the "Red or 
dead" dilemma. 
It is suggested that the Carter administration is there- 
by giving major priority to civil defense and that this 
raises ethical questions. The first part of the suggestion 
is evident nonsense; how can an item constituting .O1 per 
cent of the defense budget be a major priority? A more 
pertinent question is whether it is enough to be effective. 
The second part of the question is, however, relevant. 
The second part suggests it is somehow immoral to 
think about nuclear war and, having thought, to take 
those considered steps designed to improve the quality 
To Clarify the Issue 
Hans J. Morgenthau 
I t is impossible to state with assurance what the policy of the Carter administration is 
with regard to civil defense. As in so many other fields 
of policy, the policy of the Carter administration with 
regard to civil defense is contradictory in different 
respects. Successive statements of the same officials 
contradict each other. The statements of different offi- 
cials contradict each .other. Official statements are 
contradicted by the actual policy pursued. The realities 
of the situation militate against the policy announced. 
For the purpose of clarifying the issue let us assume 
that the administration is committed to a greatly 
expanded civil defense effort over several years, mean- 
ing primarily the evacuation of the bulk of the civilian 
population from the cities. Such a policy is, according to 
the New York Times, "farcical" on several grounds. 
Fi&+wbereh the civif an population to be evacuated 
to? Let us suppse  the goal of the evacuation would be 
Upstate New York and Connecticut. Has anybody visu- 
alized the problems of logistics such a move would 
entail? Since a comprehensive shelter program appears 
to be excluded, where would these millions of people 
find shelter and nourishment, even if they were able to 
overcome the problems of chaotic mass traffic? Even if 
all these problems were overcome, the enemy need only 
change slightly the targets of a few of its multimegaton 
missiles in order to put the evacuated millions out of 
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of our nuclear deterrent. I am confused by this sugges- 
tion. Is it based on the hypothesis that it is wrong to take 
measures designed to avoid the "better Red than dead" 
dilemma? _Or on the hypot- is t q ~  late ta make 
such measures effective andthat ac must now agree 
with G o r g e  Kennan that it _I is "bet--to-be --  Red than 
dead,':' A corollary of that hypothesis would appcarto 
be that accommodation of the new-Soviet impxium is 
the best course available-to us, gveniEsuckcourse~ere_ 
to lead to the U.S. subjecting itself to the Kremlin's will. 
Perhaps the hypothesis is -tkat&e mwe dreadful we 
make the consequences of a nuclear w X o  ourse lv~ ,  the 
more certairr we wiHwto wrdha-thepKudent has 
no real alternative in a crisis but to surrender. To do 
otherwise wouid be to3fii1g Gotterdammerung down 
%pn o u r a h a ,  even tnougli- 
well-designed military and defense -programs,-Guld 
suffer casuatties perhaps a tenth of ours: 
I await with interest the otheFai.fi-cres in this series. I 
trust they will contribute to clarifying the hypotheses 
upon which the ethical issues should be judged. 
commission. The only change the evacuation of the civil- 
ian population would bring about would be the place of 
demise. The city populations, instead of dying in their 
respective cities, would be annihilated in their respective 
places of evacuation. Die they must, if not at home, so at 
their place of refuge; if not through blast, then through 
fire and fallout. 
This argument supposes that evacuees arrive at their 
destination according to plan. But what if the evacuees 
of neighboring cities arrive at the same destination? If, 
for instance, the evacuees of Boston meet those of Hart- 
ford? Are we not going to be witness to a war of all 
against all, everybody trying to get to a place of safety 
before everybody else, and everybody fighting every- 
body tooth and nail, since allegedly sheer survival is at 
stake? 
However, we are only at the beginning of our trou- 
bles. So far we have dealt with what one might call the 
technical problems of evacuation, which appear'to be 
insurmountable. Now let us take a look at the military 
and political context. S a g  military doctrine stresses 
-I-.----._ the importance of surprise in military operations, espe- 
c ~ n u i : ~ d f w ~ ~ v a c u a t i o n  would signal to an enemy 
the likelihood of nuclear war, either perceived as an 
enemy move or intended by the evacuating government. 
Are the prospktive belligerents likely to wait until the 
evacuation is completed- or are they going to start the -- -,-- 
nuclear war as soon as the evacuation is started? Evacu- 
ation would be tantamount to an Act of War, forcing the 
hand of one or DiFother, or more likely of both of the 
pros-pi?cfiv<Giiigerents. Far from being a factor in 
-. - - 
reventingjucleq war, evacuation would be a factor in 
ma %-- ng it inevitable; for it would signal to all concerned 
that the evacuating government is ready for nuclear 
war. 
The argument against evacuation is similar to that 
made against shelters almost two decades ago. The idea 
of evacuation assumes that nuclear war is similar to 
conventional war, only more destructive than the latter. 
Some Moral Reflections 
James T. Johnson 
T here can simply be no doubt that protec- tion of noncombatants is a major priority 
of the Western tradition on warfare, generally called the 
"just war" fradition. Its general concerns are two: to 
define when the violence of war is allowable (the prob- 
lem of justification) and to set limits to what may be 
done in even a just war (the problem of limitation). Paul 
Ramsey, for example, finds both these concerns in the 
thought of Augustine of Hippo and argues that for him 
and for Christian just war theory generally they should 
be regarded as requirements of divine love. A Christian, 
on this view, has a duty in love to protect innocent 
persons being unjustly threatened by violence or sub- 
jected to it, and he may utilize counterviolence, if neces- 
sary, to effect such a defense. At the same time, the use 
of such counterviolence is limited by a number of 
restraints also derived from love, foremost of which is a 
duty also toward the unjust assailant not to harm him 
any more than necessary to defend his victim. 
A similar pattern of reasoning emerges in Jewish 
tradition. Talmudic ethics allows use of violence against 
one who pursues with the intent of doing harm; yet the 
counterviolence that is permitted is limited by two 
constraints: First, one may do no worse to the pursuer 
than what he seeks to do, and, second, one may do no 
more than needed to make the pursuer leave off his evil 
intention. Secular contributions to Western just war 
tradition have provided analogous ideas: The medieval 
code of chivalry, for example, defined the knight as 
having a duty to protect noncombatants, while the 
concept of limited war originally defined and put into 
practice by such military theorists as Frederick the 
Great sought to ensure absolute protection of noncom- 
batants outside a combat area and relative protection 
inside such an area. The requirements of defending 
noncombatants against the ravages of war is thus at the 
very core of Western thought on how war can be a moral 
enterprise. 
Still, there are numerous ways to defend against 
violence: running away or, more generally, putting the 
threatened out of reach of the threatener; interposing an 
JAMES T. JOHNSON, who heads the Department of Religion at 
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In truth, nuclear war, by virtue of its unimaginable 
daiructiveness, is qualitatively different from conven- 
tional war. In conventional war you can rationally resort 
to evacuation and shelters. In nuclear war there is no 
place to hide. You have to prevent it in order to avoid 
destruction. Once deterrence has failed, only one ques- 
tion remains: How do you want to die-at home or 
elsewhere, in a shelter or above ground? 
impregnable shield between threatener and threatened; 
warding off the attack of an assailant with skillful 
parries; fighting back or striking pre-emptively in an 
attempt to disarm or disable the assailant; threatening to 
retaliate violently if the original threat is carried 
through. If all the above methods would be equally 
effective in a given situation, then the sequence of this 
list defines an order of moral priority among these meth- 
ods: Those presented first are preferable to those 
presented later. 
The old civil defense program, which aimed at build- 
ing shelters to protect city populations against nuclear 
blast and fallout, was a form of shield defense, while the 
new program recently announced by the Carter adminis- 
tration represents an attempt to defend by putting 
threatened noncombatants out of reach of the violence 
of nuclear attack. Similarly, ABMs constitute a defense 
oriented at fighting back with intent to disarm, while 
mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy is a version 
of defense by the threat of retaliation. Prima facie, the 
Western just war tradition would seem to favor civil 
defense p;ograms over these last types of defense against 
countercity nuclear attack, since civil defense aims to 
maximize the restraints on use of violence in defense. 
But such a prima facie judgment would be, in this case, 
wrong. 
Just war tradition permits violence if it is necessary to 
an effectual defense, and such violence is allowed up to 
and including the level of violence employed by the "un- 
just" or "pursuing" attacker. It is clear that in this 
moral tradition one may kill if necessary to prevent an 
innocent person from being killed. The permission to 
resort to such a response in kind includes permission to 
threaten to do so. Thus we are all well off the scent if we 
take the concern of just war tradition to defend noncom- 
batants to rule out the threat of retaliation, or if we take 
it to imply that programs of civil defense, which are 
inherently nonviolent, are ipso facto to be preferred 
over means of defense that threaten violence against the 
attacker. This tradition is concerned with the protection 
of nonc jmbatants, and that requires an effective de- 
fense. This in turn requires that moral analysis take into 
account the relative effectiveness of various possible 
modes of defense as well as their abstract moral prefera- 
bility in terms of the level of violence each entails. 
CIVIL DEFENSE / 43 
The only thing that can be said in favor of mutual 
assured destruction as a defensive strategy is that for 
quite some time now it has worked to help prevent a 
nuclear war. But that is a great deal to say for it. And 
given the proposed scale of the Carter civil defense 
program, this program will not replace such a strategy of 
retaliation but can only supplement it. Were this new 
program the leading edge of an effort to substitute civil 
defense entirely for MAD, we would have to weigh the 
Reasons in Opposition 
John C. Bennett 
B efore our government embarks on the proposed forms of civil defense I hope 
that the following reasons for not doing so will be taken 
very seriously. 
Preparations for the evacuation of cities in a s o c i a a s  
free u ours would iavslvve such drastic actions that they 
would be more of a signal than,we would intend of our 
readiness for nuclear war. Combined with any build-up 
q ~ i ~ n _ u _ c ~ ~ ~ ~ - s u g g e s t t d  a fint-strike 
capability t_o the other side, they x~u1-prevoc- 
a w t s  appears to us, -,- to ---- whon?_ihe~ - would seem 
innocent aniK88ensive. TPhls reminds me of the account 
by Thucjldides 0r'tKe"great pains the Athenians took to 
conceal from the Spartans the fact that they were 
rebuilding their walls after the Persian wars. What could 
be more innocent and defensive than a wall! 
Greater account must be taken of the fears of the 
Sov~et Union. In the long run they may fear China more 
than the U S .  We are their powerful adversary, who for 
deca Jes expressed, more unofficially than officially, 
hostility to the Soviet Union. How much of a residue 
there is in the USSR of a dogmatic belief in the inevita- 
bility of war between the two systems, I do not know. A 
tuo-front war is in their minds, and they even speak of 
China as an eastern member of NATO. They know that 
the countries of Eastern Europe that are s u p p e d  to be 
in their samp are not reliable allies. They even fear the 
U.S may come to have a powerful presence in Iran. 
There is in the background something the Russians 
remember and exaggerate and we have forgotten: the 
American military presence in Siberia in 1917-20. It is 
also not forgotten that the U.S. is the only nation ever to 
use atomic bombs, that most of the victims were civil- 
ians, and that the US. since World War I1 has dropped 
more bombs on other nations than have the rest of the 
nations combined. We do not see ourselves in this light 
at all. Indeed, what others see is quite out of line with 
our own present intentions as a nation. But fears and 
provocations depend on what others see. 
The second reason for not going ahead is what such a --- 
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impligtlons of such a substitution. But as a supplement 
to existing strategic defense policy, it presumably aims 
at maintaining a balance between the superpowers as to 
what level of destruction could be sustained by their 
societies in the event of a nuclear interchange. Thus it is 
an effort to bolster the stalemate. A full moral analysis 
of this new civil defense program therefore would have 
to weigh it within this larger context of a continuing 
reliance on defense by retaliatory threat. 
form of civil d&mcasik+q&rati~n to evacuate cities 
would do to our own people. .&ain, this would necessi- 
tate taking such authoritarian m&~s7C+aTE€iis11 so 
unaccustomed to them as to make a great impression on 
the American people, leading them to become accus- 
tomed to nuclear war as more than urnate gos_sibility. 
Official explanations, which in such matters always 
seem too optimistic, might create the sense that nuclear 
war could be survived, not only by a large majority of 
our people, but also by our free institutions and other 
aspects of our life that we believe most worth defending. 
Such an outcome is highly doubtful. The secondary 
effects of nuclear explosions would be played down, and 
the more remote genetic effects on futufe generations 
would not be considered. It might be better to die 
instantly in Manhattan than slowly in New Jersey. We 
cannot trust the Pentagon's weighing of the intangible 
effects of nuclear war. 
. . better to die instantly in Manhattan than 
slowly in New Jersey. " 
Also, mmqahmbyAuqmp1~~in such preparations 
might w_eg_ncrn_crease our own fear of the Russians and our 
IOS'TiIify toward them. We have long had a tendency to 
6e i i b T e G ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ I G n a t b n  of anticommunism and 
anti-Szmi-~&@~Abut in recent years we have in large _- --- 
measure moved away from it. Eartheamerican people 
once more to be c~ntrolkd> this obsession would 
d- QUL&~ and i m t i e $ - a c t h e  other 
side. I fear thatprepatinns f8~evacuatbn of c i t ie4wt  - 
me -- thorough -*.. enpugh to-be w t  would -the 
end of detenre and of a n y ~ i s e - & ~ h e ~ , m s  
raCe;TlilTw~liT~~~eeeVen if wt: l-d~hat Russia's 
more authoritarian government had & k e ~  to 
recognize the grounds I have mentioned for Russian 
fears and its history of invasion by others. 
The Misguided Concept 
Thomas J. Downey 
A nyone who believes that the Soviet Union, beGse of .its civil defense program, is 
better able to survive a nuclear war than the United 
States is totally misguided. And anyone willing to-a~cept 
such a foolish argume-ntis3hi ta three basicfacts. 
First, the inassive urban evacuation program would 
have Hmiit$leff~tjveness in rduGng the disastrous 
effefs of a nuclear attack on the general papulation, 
even supposing that sucb a scheme could be effectively 
---- 
gic ylanners are conte-mplating a first-strike scenario 
againsf the United States (as many American ha-wks 
state in their arguments for an American civil defense 
evih5uation scheme), they would be unahle to employ 
taeir_urban evacuation plan, because to do so would 
-C 
obvjausly destroy the element of surprise needed for any 
first strike to succeed. . - 
What would Soviet urban evacuation on a massive 
scale-if it could actually be accomplished with Russia's 
very limited transportation system-actually accom- 
plish? Millions of city dwellers fleeingto the country- 
side would prgscnt trmendaus logistical problems even 
under the best of conditions, and the Russian climate 
and terrain are iiot n ~ t e d  for mildness and hosp@ality. 
An American nuclear counterstrike would be designed 
to destroy the Russian industrial base for waging war 
and the entire economic structure of the enemy for 
recovery. It is presently_estimated that two-thirds of the 
Soviet industrial b a s e d d  -be-destroyed within hours. 
Wia asha tk rd -  g\o.crni~ base, a crippled transporta- 
tion system, and the '!means of production" in ashes, 
Soviet evacuees would be left with only stockpiled food, 
medicine, and heating oil. There would be no hope of 
replenishing these essedak. Furth~rmore, fight- to 
rural arsjs-n-oLefens_eag_ainserifting clouds of nucle- 
ar r a i t i o n ;  and radiation, not blast effect, is the prima- 
ry cause of death in the civilian poplation, whether 
u ~ i r ~  o  rural. Also, i f? coun@ntrike occurred before 
evacuation were complete, the civilian evacuees would 
be much more vulnerable on the road than they- would 
have been at home. It should be remembered too that 
food-producing areas are also imprtant strategic tar- 
gets, and this further limits the imagined safety of flight 
to the countryside. 
Though nuclear-targeting doctrine in the Seventies 
does not have the aim of slaughtering the civilian popu- 
lation, a very high proportion of the population in any 
country receiving a nuclear attack would be killed, in the 
attack and from its aftereffects, whether they fled the 
urban areas or not. Neither Russia nor the United States 
THOMAS J. DOWNEY (D-New York) s e ~ u  on thc Committtc 
on Armed Services of the House of Representativu. 
can possibly hope to protect its civilian population to the 
extent that nuclear confrontation could be thought safe. 
Nuclear war would be the greatest possible mistake for 
both sides. 
It would bem&y irresponsible to lead the Ameri- ----- ---- - 
can people to believe that safety from a nuclear attack 
cou?irTe -fOund~tTiiTu@-eVaCui3~I ~onveYseTy; 'we 
must not give the  Soviet Union the impressionthat we 
believe they have an advantage or a ckancs: of sIl;nriyal 
because of their evacuation program. They do not; and, 
furthermore, anv use -ac . . uation 
would_becnsls 
-7-- 
destabilizing. accelerating t o d  am- 
fllct. In the event of a crisis situation-say, Soviet inter- 
Civil Wense  the Last Time Around 
Basement Concrete-Block Fallout Shelter (Otfrce of Civil and 
Defense Mobilization diagram). A pair of slippers l i a  in readiness for 
the shelter's one (!?) inhabitant. 
ference with the supply of oil to the West from the 
Persian G u l f - t h e U n l t e d n -  
dantly clear to the_Ssviet_s_ that an implementation of 
their urban evacuation program would be seen as a 
prelude to a strike against us and that our nuciear focces 
would be put on alert accordingly- If the U S .  had-an 
evag-qJi~sckane and p u t i t  i n t o s f f e a  the Russians 
would-xd.oub gaon alest, and the -movement toward 
nuclear confrontation would be similarly uelerated. 
Not on& iuhiL_d.d.ms evacuation ineffectke- in 
protecting the general. population and u s x s s  in plan- 
nmg a surpris~first stake,$ could actually incregse the 
wed by planning to maintain calm and 
American cities in a crisis, whether 
of war or natural disaster. In the event 
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The Illusion of Protection 
Richard J. Barnet 
T he policy of the Carter administration is to increase substantially civil defense expen- 
ditures. In terms of money it is not a "majority priori- 
ty," since the administration plans to lock us into overall 
military expenditures on the order of $1.8 trillion in 
1977 dollars by 1988. The justification for the increased 
civil defense expenditure is that it is a "modest" increase 
in response to demands for a much bigger program and a 
counter to the Soviet program. There is a strong pork 
barrel element in the program too. Just as civil defense 
was the justification for building the nation's highway 
system, it is now being quietly presented to local offi- 
cials as a way to get some money into local communities 
in a time of austerity. It is also a way to buy off opposi- 
tion to a SALT treaty, or so it is thought. 
All such justifications for the program are utterly 
irresponsible. To spend billions on civil defense when 
crucial programs essential to the strength of the nation 
are being slashed is pathological. Appeasing critics of 
the SALT treaty by throwing them a "harmless" bone is 
self-defeating, for the program lends credibility to their 
view of reality, not that of the treaty advocates, and cre- 
ates a climate in which it is easier to defeat the treaty. 
- The idea that we should "match" the Soviets, or even, 
within very broad limits, be influenced by what they do 
in civil defense, is puerile. If they were developing a 
program that suggested an ability or an intent to elimi- 
nate virtually all civilian casualties, that would be cause 
for concern. It would suggest an effort to create what we 
used to call a "credible first-strike posture." But that is 
not the case. The Soviet program becomes threatening 
only if we assume that the leaders are prepared to sacri- 
fice a substantial portion of their population, or more. 
For-the&- program, as the CZA .Bas ts-qerted,_ ca.qn,ot 
prc?_.ec=-M- 10. a audy  
of the Natio_nalS3tyritx Ch.un&Jhe Sovjettwm- 
fer moie than a hunrred-million =stig.in_a-nr?gclx 
war. m e  S ~ i e t s  spena moneymany ways the U.S. would 
be foolish to imitate. Civil &3e=ee~s a % i m s ; - -  
A civil defense program is a waste of money not only 
because it cannot protect the society from the effects of 
a nuclear war,it is harmful because it -ion 
that Americaps can be "pr-." J t  causes the 
government to make outrageous&m~su~hb as lht:-on_e 
t ~ _ a _ t _ t T . ~ K ~ , ~ ~ . k s a ~ ~ 4 y 4 y e . v a c u a t i n g  
the cities (anyone who has ever tried to leave a ciiy in a 
normal holiday weekerf&;-ttn-af6fieeanucTearalert, ebbws 
how - ~ y _ t h g - s ) .  It rein 
t a m  of suclrai~;o-l 
dynamic pushing us toward the ultimate catastrophcJf 
nu? 
start ~t believe that it cannot be avoided. Only an insane 
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leader of the U.S. or the USSR would choose nuclear 
war m o  conceivable national interest on 
e m e r  side U d  iustifv the 
believed to be nuclear war 
wdecls ion to pre-e - 
ble f u t u j a t m e e m  lausible. The drill for death 
thilti.&rns so pathological +- when one on a small scale, as 
at Jonestown, brings us closer to war because it condi- 
tions us to accept the inevitability of war. The most 
helping brainwash a_generasbaaiatcz .aax&q+U 
-:We% iio'B?"e&tive t o ~ q & g h u u a h i d e .  
f -rememkr a fi-pul"d%cabout Nazi Germany 
called Education for Death. It was one of the most 
telling critiques of the moral bankruptcy of a regime 
that preached the inevitability of war and drilled the 
whole society into accepting that belief. Anything that 
legitimizes nuclear war by perpetuating the illusion that 
it is simply an extension of old-fashioned war and not an 
historic watershed betrays an arrogant disregard for the 
future of the planet. We are only beginning to under- 
s~~tt~~Jogica1 effects-of f i ~ u ~ _ t & m  
are c u c h  more serCous th~iprgisusl&~euse 
the life-suj@mt- syi&&s7-r,sei& -etc=are 
i n i v e x v e  no idea of the real extent or dura- 
tTon of the & y irragatingvaqti?%iof €he 
phmsei-aiX- h a u n . i m d . ~  to 
future e n q a h s .  All we can be reasonably sure of is 
t p- at the effects will be worse than we plan for. To foster 
the belief that nuclear war is "manageable" or "winna- 
ble" or justified for any political purpose is a way of 
avoiding the real ethical issue-that this generation is not 
the owner of the earth, only a steward or a trustee. To 
assert the right to destroy it is the ultimate blasphemy. 
Some Possible Problems 
David T. Johnson 
W hile the Carter administration is clearly paying more attention to civil defense 
and will undoubtedly request more funding for crisis- 
relocation planning, this does not yet constitute giving 
Many of the questions related to the desirability or 
undesirability of more stress on civil defense are essen- 
tially unanswerable. We simply cannot know with assur- 
ance how it will affect U.S. security or the chances of 
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nuclear war. P & h k p a m k a & e  made on both sides, 
but it is mostly speculation. Nobody who feels strongly 
oixewagoi the other is likely to have his views changed. 
The debate will be predictably inconclusive. 
What masquerades as rational decisionmaking on 
most issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is really 
a strikingly subjective process in which no one should 
have much confidence. Decisions are reached, such as 
the decision to expand civil defense preparations, on the 
basis of a hodgepodge of relevant and irrelevant consid- 
erations. Different people and groups will oppose or 
support the decision for their own reasons. Shifting tides 
of prejudice and habit will play a determining part. 
It is certain the debate over civil defense in 1979 will 
be primarily presented as an issue of whether the U.S. 
should be strong vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. More intel- 
lectual types will be appealed to on the basis of the 
presumed moderate, prudent, humanitarian character of 
the Carter civil defense insurance policy. In the existing 
climate there will be less than adequate attention paid to 
some possible problems arising out of the new civil 
defense thrust. 
The Soviet threat. Regardless of whatever plausible- 
sounding arguments are made for the Carter civil 
defense program, an unavoidable consequence of selling 
the program to the American people and the Congress 
will be an increase in their fear and suspicion of the 
Soviet Union. Of course this is the whole point of the 
exercise for some people. Others, perhaps even Presi- 
dent Carter and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, may 
be less pleased with this side effect. It may complicate, 
rather than help, the SALT ratification process. 
U.S. military weakness. Both President Carter and 
Secretary Brown have on numerous occasions down- 
played the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense activities 
in shielding the Soviet Union from the effects of an 
American nuclear strike. They have expressed firm 
confidence in the American deterrent irrespective of 
Soviet civil defense. However, the effort to promote the 
new U.S. civil defense program will undoubtedly stimu- 
late widespread concern in the U.S. about the possible 
potency of Soviet civil defense. It will inspire unneces- 
sary anxieties about U.S. nuclear strength. 
Percept io~.  I n ~ r ~ ~ $ g l y ,  American militarx_&!ro- 
: -rams are being argued fp_t 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 6 ~ n ~ ~ f  what other 
countries might think of the U.S., their "perceptions" of 
U.S. power or weakness. Officials seem-willing to advo- 
cate programs that are needed just to improve "percep- 
tmns," even if their strictly military justification is!ess 
than compelling. The Carter administration's-civil ae- 
fense program has just this character. In April, 1978, 
the New York Times quoted from a secret' ten-pge 
memorandum from Secretary Brown to tharesident:  -- 
I Xs you know, the Soviets have shown great interest and , considerable activity in this field. While I do not believe ,' that the effort significantly enhances the prospects for Sovi- 
i et society as a whole following any full-scale nuclear ' i 
1 exchange, it has obviously hat. an effect on international 1 
j perceptions, particularly in contrast to our small and static j 
1 civil defense program. For that reason alone I believe at 
1 I c a s _ t m ~ ~ s o u l d h a v e  otf, 
- T m p h a s i s  added]. 
An expansion of U.S. civil defense justified primarily on 
the basis of "international perceptions" (perceptions 
that Secretary Brown appears to find in error) seems 
somewhat dubious. It may encourage equally question- 
able decisionmaking on other defense issues. 
Camel's narc- Mare civil defense preparations may be 
the camel's nose under the tent. Once the American 
people are convinced of the efficacy of some "limitedfi , - 
civil defense measures, they will be appealed to e n  the *- ' 
same grounds for additional means of protection. 
Expansion-of U S .  air defense capability and stepped-up 
ABM research and potential deployment of new ABM 
systems are likely follow-ons. If a little protection is 
good, why not more? 
Fear of nuclear war. Another apparently unavoid- 
able-if unintended-consequence of the new stress on 
civil defense will be that it will serve as a signal of the 
g~er-j%%ii6iTTtYoffnucTear war. It is more likely that f~ 
this ipcreas-d_ fear willkmahilized in thedirection of 
military build-up and "tough" foreign policy actions 
than in the direction of reducing nuclear arsenals. 
The heart of the danger in the civil defense issue 
today was reflected in the words of Clyde Mitchell, 
director of Oklahoma City's civil defense program: "We 
don't want to lay down and die in Oklahoma City. Folks 
around here say, yes, eventually we are going to come to 
a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. It's sort of 
inevitable." 
The Background Music 
Paul Ramsey 
T he trial balloons recently sent up about protecting our population in the event of 
nuclear war focus on the staged evacuation of cities- 
not, as in the early Sixties, on bomb shelters. The aim 
today is more on countering nuclear threats, less on 
protecting people or defending the nation. A capability 
to maneuver people (like troops) is ~ ~ ~ ~ & e - t f j e  
p r e s i d e n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ f o f o f i e j @ _ n ~ @ t _ o ~ a ; ~  blackmail. 
This is what is called crisis management, and it has a 
"logic" of its own. For example, the US, would have to 
be-able to move people out of cities, or protect them 
t h e s i n  vastly greater numkrs  than- Russia needs to do 
simply lo make fhings even. We. have far more of our 
poptxatioeinh-mare and far rnose-populotls metropol- 
itan areas than has Russia* The president,jf_ he is__sensi- 
ble, is more Wrely^ts*eld tcL P~JNS-movm u ~ d e r w v e r  
o ~ - ~ ~  Qyats than is Russia. He must blink k t .  
Under such conditions, who now has the more ~ r d i b l e  
deters&.? 
The main question to be raised about civil defense in a 
nuclear age never was whether this is feasible or not. 
PAUL RAMSEY is Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Chris- 
tian Ethics at Princeton University. 
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(The plans-long in existence-for the staged evacua- 
tion of Oklahoma City are reported to be practical [New 
York Times, December 1 ,  19781. Oklahoma City is a 
good-size Russian city!) Listen to the background music 
in some of these responses in Worldview and the forth- 
caming national debate over this proposal (if there is 
one). It will be evident that the morality and feasibility- 
of massive deterrence is the issue. Yesterday, today, and 
forever in a nuclear age this will be the issue, not one 
component part of such a strategy. Those who accept the 
desirability or the irreformability of mutual assured 
destruction (the MAD policy) will argue that civil 
defense is infeasible. The background music, however, is 
that such defense Is undesirable because MAD is the 
only sound or moral strategic policy. By this we get 
peace, with-it will also be supposed-fewer bucks and 
no bangs. 
I myself doubt there will again be serious discussion 
of the morality or immorality of the Deterrent Siate 
such as there was in the early Sixties. For what can be 
better khan peace, even if the means are immorally 
aimed at civilian hostages? Peace with butter-and a 
national health plan. 
In the early Sixties I was one of two theologians who 
dared address the matter of "shelter morality." L.C. 
McHugh and I* probed mainly the micro-problem of 
what one should do in the event of a breakdown of all 
government and human beings were returned to a '%ate 
of nature" or, at least, to that stage of society in which 
the paterfamilias or limited local chieftains served also 
as the highest known political authorities, before the 
emergence of the differentiation of "government" in 
larger societies. To such a primitive political situation, I 
argued, we would be returned by nuclear destruction of 
modern organized states; and that then the remaining 
"magistrates" should do what they must to save life 
when all lives cannot be saved-protecting by whatever 
means the capacity of a bomb shelter to save life, 
perhaps against desperate human beings banging at the 
door, whom to admit would mean all would be lost. The 
Princeton faculty planned, in those days, to designate 
the underground levels of Firestone Library as a place of 
refuge for ourselves and the students, for whom we had 
first responsibility, then as a community shelter to the 
extent the facilities allowed. This was proper planning, 
but only if the larger context was proper. 
Father McHugh may have been told to write no more; 
and it would have saved personal energy if I also had 
been so told-since few then or now in the church or in 
American political society seem able to be convinced 
that the chief thing wrong with fallout shelters or city 
evacuations is not their infeasibility but, rather, their 
participation in the gross immorality of our MAD deter- 
rence policy. The articulate elites in our nation and in 
the churches seem to believe that they can accept the 
Deterrent State while still braying against civil defense 
*LC.  McHugh, w.. "Ethics at the Shelter Doorway," Ameri- 
ca (September 30, 1961); Paul Ramsey, "Shelter Morality," 
Presbyterian Life (November 15, 1961); with correspondence. 
January 1, 1962. Father McHugh concentrated more exclu- 
sively on the micro-problem than I-if anyone wants to know. 
and even against vats of Pentagon poison. Thus the 
neutron bomb was opposed, even though it is a more 
discriminate weapon. It kills people was the vocal 
reason. The real reason was: We ought to do nothing to 
weaken or alter our single-minded intention to destroy 
entire populations on the condition that we are 
attacked-to prevent that attack, of course! 
Looking back, I should have introduced this further 
micro-point. I should have made the case for a just revo- 
lution against the Deterrent State that meam to make 
no defense of its people. In a thrice the theory of justifi- 
able revolution can be directed against a government 
such as ours that means to maneuver its citizens (wheth- 
er to protect them or not) as if we all are soldiers, and 
that also treats the entire citizenry of an adversary as if 
they were combatants, pawns in the power struggle 
between nations. 
"How explain [the churches '] acceptance of 
the systematic political intention of  the U.S. 
to do evil that good may come?" 
I should have argued that every head of household, or 
local councilman, is in principle already a chief magis- 
trate who may be called upon to overthrow the magis- 
trates in power who have abandoned the intention to 
wage only just war. That, in short, MAD has placed us 
before such deterrence fails in a situation like the one 
when deterrence fails. I should have argued with John 
Calvin that "if there be, in the present day, any magis- 
trates appointed for the protection of the people and the 
moderation of the power of kings . . . I am so far from 
prohibiting them in the discharge of their duty, to 
oppose the violence and cruelty of kings, that I affirm 
that if they connive in their oppression of their people, 
such forebearance involves the most nefarious perfidy, 
because they fraudulently betray the [lives and] liberty 
of the people, of which they know that they have been 
appointed protectors by the ordinance of God." Such 
connivance now takes the stark form of taking hostages 
and giving the people of one's own nation over to be 
hostages to deter a nuclear enemy. Any "forebearance" 
to raise democratic opposition to massive deterrence or, 
that failing. to bring about radical reform in military 
policy, to raise a revolution against such government, is 
indeed a nefarious perfidy. 
The greatest betrayal, however, has been that of the 
churches. How explain our acceptance of the systematic 
political intention of the U.S. to do evil that good may 
come? Especially, how can this be excused on the part of 
spokesmen of churches whose stance is cooperation with 
pol i t id  institutions when just and necessary; disagree- 
mast, opposition, and efforts to reform when they are 
not? HOW excuse the exertions of political participatory 
religious influence that seizes so many occasions to 
fasten the hold of an unaltered MAD policy upon us. 
instead of undertaking the difficult intellectual and 
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practical task of finding and supporting those military 
policies and weapons decisions that can transform this 
system?* 
A nonpacifist Christian should experience an endur- 
ing moral sorrow over the exclusive attention of the 
church to other concerns in recent years, and over it$ 
misattention to this one. Even Christians who stand 
within the tradition of involvement in the constraining 
realities of politics know, or should know, that the state 
can become a beast or a drunken "harlot sitting on the 
seven hills." 
This is a moment of mortal peril for our nation, all the 
more because it is unrecognized. By mortal peril 1 do not 
so much mean survival as our place in the future mohl 
and political history of mankind. Symbolically, but only 
symbolically, the critical moment was Martin Luther 
King, Jr.'s, Riverside Church address linking the plight 
of the poor and the blacks to the Vietnam war (April 4, 
1967). Then liberals supposed there would be a "peace 
dividend" resulting from extrication from that war. 
King only tapped beliefs already deeply imbedded in the 
mentality of the articulate liberal blite, especially in the 
churches. 
There was no such "peace dividend" in sight of any 
realistic analysis at that time. It is not surprising, then, 
--- - 
*It is rather late, if not too late, to cite in support of options to 
our confirmed MAD policy the following experts who are no 
way contaminated by theological politid reasoning: Arthur 
Lee Burns ( Adelphi Paper, No. 69, "Ethics and Deterrence: 
A Nuclear Balance Without Hostage Cities?" [London: Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, July, 19701); Donald G. Brennan of 
the Hudson Institute, who first coined the MAD acronym 
(New York Times, Op. Ed. page [May 24 and 25, 19711); and 
Bruce M. R w t t  ("Short of Nuclear Madness," Worldview 
[April. 19721). In this and other articles Russett advocated a 
countercombatant deterrent. The Russians are adequately 
deterred by a credible threat that the U.S. can and will wipe 
out their army on the Chinese border; there is no nted to aim 
at their civilian population. For the record I may add that in 
earlier writings on the morality of warfare and of deterrence 
my expression "counterforce" took its meaning from its o p p  
site, "counterpeople." I never meant to say the U.S. should 
develop the overwhelming power to destroy Russia's missile 
forces with impunity. Russett's expression "countercombat- 
a d '  exactly expresses my meaning-including their military 
forces, of coursc. 
that those already addicted to such expectations have 
since continued to befuddle U.S. foreign policy by the 
same hopes. This leads such people to place greater and 
greater reliance on "minimum" deterrence, meantime 
blinding themselves to sound discussion of any such 
policy by rhetorical persuasions that we already had too 
much. 
So I seriously suggest that any sensible person-for 
his own serenity, if for no other reason, whether 
possessed of the apostle John's ultimate faith or not- 
refuse to discuss or get agitated about any single item or 
all the separate items together that are on our present 
military agenda unless he or she has some expectation of 
opening again the discussion of the basic immorality and 
the final irrationality of the present shape of mutual 
deterrence. This would be a sound political resolution 
whether the specific issue is bomb shelters or staged city 
evacuation or the neutron bomb or the Trident subma- 
rine or SALT 11, or whether we already have overkilled 
and can safely cut the defense budget, or our commit- 
ment to NATO to increase the budget by 3 per cent, 
beyond inflation, or whether we can abandon altogether 
our contimtt&ged missiles and depend on the other 
two parts of the tkipod (submarine and air-based city- 
destroying missiles), or should learn to move the 
Minuteman missiles around or instead increase their 
throw-weight or multiple accuracy. 
These are only some of the options in contention. 
Discussion of them is "sound and fury signifying noth- 
ing," unless and until we relate them each and every one 
to the radical transformation of mutual massive nuclear 
deterrence. As long as any of t h w  options is only a 
subordi?ate aspect of MAD, it too is equally M-A-D, 
however feasible or infeasible when considered alone. If 
a sound discussion of military strategy could be 
launched, it would not have as a basic premise "more 
bang for the buck." But neither can the premise be-to 
which the religious are inclined-the notions that we 
can have enough immorally intended but planned-not- 
to-be-used bangs with fewer bucks, or that what was 
once called "minimum deterrence" is a good idea 
because it promises that we can turn our attention to the 
priority of domestic claims on the Federal budget, or 
that distributing more butter could possibly justify the 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I Congressional Research Service - 
a The Library of Congress 
CIVIL DEFENSE BUDGET 
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  r e q u e s t s  f o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  on  t h e  f i s c a l  y e a r  1982 and 
1983 budge t  o u t l o o k  f o r  c i v i l  d e f e n s e ,  we have  g a t h e r e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
i n f o r m a t i o n .  The FY 1982 a p p r o p r i a t i o n  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  F e d e r a l  Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) , which h a s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  c i v i l  d e f e n s e  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  a r e  from t h e  Housing and Urban Development and I n d e p e n d e n t  
Agenc ies  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  Act o f  1982 (P.L. 97-101) ,  a s  v e r i f i e d  b y  FEMA. 
The f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  FY 1983 b u d g e t  r e q u e s t  were  p r o v i d e d  b y  FEMA. The 
budget  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h r e e  m a j o r  c a t e g o r i e s .  
CIVIL DEFENSE PORTION OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY BUDGET 
I .  S t a t e  and Loca l  A s s i s t a n c e  
i n  t h o u s a n d s  o f  d o l l a r s  
u n a d j u s t e d  f o r  i n f l a t i o n  
FY82 ( a c t u a l )  FY83 ( r e q u e s t )  
A. S t a t e  and Loca l  A s s i s t a n c e  
3 .  R a d i o l o g i c a l  A s s i s t a n c e  
C.  Nuc lea r  A t t a c k - - C i v i l  P r e p a r e d n e s s  
D .  Emergency O p e r a t i n g  C e n t e r s  
E .  Communications and Warning 
11. Emergency p l a n n i n g  and A s s i s t a n c e  
A .  Research  
B. T r a i n i n g  and E d u c a t i o n  
C.  Telecommunicat ions  and Warning 
1. T e l e c o m a u n i c a t i o n s  and Warning 
2. Communications and Warning 
111. S a l a r y  and Expenses  
T o t a l  
Source  : FEMA Budget O f  f i c e  , F e b r u a r y  1 0 ,  1982 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e f e r e n c e  D i v i s i o n  
New Civil-Defense Aim: 
Empty Major Cities 
Will Reagan's plan to evacuate 
target areas improve chances 
for peace--or risk nuclear 
war? Views are split over a big 
switch in U.S. strategy. 
Amid rising controversy over Presi- 
dent Reagan's nuclear-arms policy, a 
White House plan for a vast new civil- 
defense program has ignited a political 
firestorm. 
The plan spelled out in late March 
calls, in case of a nuclear showdown 
with the Soviet Union, for evacuating to 
the countryside the 145 million Arneri- 
cans living in 400 high-risk areas in big 
cities and near vital military bases. 
Key to the proposal is the assump- 
tion that risk of a nuclear war would be 
obvious days before it actually began- 
not a surprise attack of the sort that 
formed the basis of the last civil-de- 
fense program, which called for send- 
ing people to nearby shelters. 
Experts predict that an all-out nucle- 
ar attack today probably would kill 
era1 chaos would result if officials tried 
to empty America's largest cities. Still 
other opponents contended that mon- 
ey could be better spent in other ways 
to increase the nation's defenses. 
The new civil-defense scheme differs 
significantly from those put forward in 
the 1950s and 1960s, largely because of 
the enormous rise in the number of 
nuclear weapons now aimed at the US. 
Once it was assumed that an atomic 
attack would destroy some cities but 
leave many others intact. Kow the as- 
sumption is that 400 targets-all the 
U.S. cities of more than 50,000 popula- 
tion, the bomber and nuclear-subma- 
rine bases, the missile silos and other 
military and industrial sites-might be 
hit almost simultaneously. 
The number of Americans living or 
working in those high-risk areas totals 
145 million, and for them there would 
be no place to hide. 
The new plan is to move them out 
into the countryside to host areas 
where they would be relatively safe 
from blast, heat and the initial burst of 
nuclear radiation. They would require 
protection-perhaps for weeks-from 
some 139 million of the nation's popu- 
lation of 231 million. Proponents claim 
the new ~ l a n  would cut the death , u,., ,,,,,; ,,,,, 
toll to abbut 46 million. 
"Our goal is to double the num- 
ber of Americans that would sur- 
vive from a major Soviet attack on 
the U.S.," said Louis 0 .  Giuffrida, 
director of the Federal Emergen- 
cy Management Agency. 
Strategic aim. The plan also has 
a strategic purpose: To prevent a 
situation from developing during 
an eyeball-to-eyeball confronta- 
tion in which the Soviets could 
empty their cities but the U.S. 
could not. thus perhaps encourag- 
ing the Russians to believe they 
could strike first and win. 
Critics, some of them already at 
odds with the administration over 
the issue of a nuclear-weapons 
freeze, retorted that the new civ- 
il-defense program is part of an 
effort by the Reagan administra- 
tion to convince Americans that it 
is possible to fight-and win-a 
nuclear war. Merely putting the 
plan into effect, opponents 
warned, would edge closer the 
possibility of an atomic holocaust. 
Others attacked the program 
on a pragmatic basis, arguing that 
monumental traffic jams and gen- 
deadly radioactive particles carried by 
the winds. 
The new approach is predicated on 
the conviction of civil-defense planners 
that the US. would get several days' 
notice of an impending Soviet nuclear 
attack during a period of gro\+.ing ten- 
sion, as occurred in the Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962. Aside from being tipped 
off by an exchange of demands and 
threats, officials count on the detection 
by intelligence sources of other signs of 
danger such as movement of ships and 
troops and a higher alert status for Rus- 
sian nuclear forces. 
Ruled out: Surprise. Administration 
experts consider a bolt-from-the-blue 
surprise attack very unlikely, because 
this would bar evacuation of Soviet cit- 
ies and leave the Russian population 
defenseless against a return blow from 
the United States. "Even if we ha\,e as 
little as 3 hours' warning, our progrbm 
will save lives," says Giuffrida of FEMA. 
"If we have a week's warning, our pro- 
gram will be of significant benefit." 
In contrast to earlier civil-defense 
programs that called for widespread CI- 
vilian preparation in the form of fallout 
shelters and stocking of emergency 
supplies, the new plan requires \.irtual- 
ly no involvement by most Americans 
until a nuclear war appears imminent. 
If that happens, this is how the plan is 
supposed to unfold: 
rn Each target city would have its 
own-~evaciation ~ I a n .  with a corm of 
Picnic 
civildefense workers tramed to 
direct the exodus Evacuation 
maps, along with instructions on 
where to go and what to do. \rould 
be printed in telephone books 
rn When people from the clties 
reached the countrys~de, man\ 
would be put to work Some would 
operate kitchens for mass feedmg 
Others would be handed shovels 
and told to stack dirt around shel- 
ters for protection agamst radia- 
fildn fr6m nuclear fallout 
XEGCTii&%<umbk housed in 
schools, churches aild other pub- 
lic buildings, not in private 
homes. Englneering students 
hlred dpring the summers alread) 
have checked out 975,000 of the 
-1bn shelters needed 
Each person would be._a_lllotted 
an area-of 40 squEee'feet-about 
61/3 feet on a side. If a cloud of 
nuclear fallout were expected, 
evacuees would move into much 
more crowded fallout shelters 
D During p ~ a c e t i m e ,  20,000 
shelter-management instructors 
would be trained. In a crisis, they 
would conduct crash courses to 
teach a miibrrpthers 
m n - & H i o n  radiation_-de- 
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 12, 1982 
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vices wo-u& be available to tell survi- 
vors when they could leave the shel- 
ters and where they could safely travel. 
m News and instruct~ons would come 
from some of th_e 7 dca'st sta- 
tions that w d d  b-m fall- 
out and the-bruptiag effects-of r a a -  
ti%-@yen off b l  a nuclear explo'sYon 
Critics of the $GiTeiz&on-a com- 
ment by T. K. Jones, a longtime c i d -  
defense advocate and now a deputy 
under secretary of defense, in an inter- 
view with the Los Angeles Trmes. '=- 
erybody's goingt-e it i;f there are 
enough _shov& to go around," ]&es 
said. "Dig a hole, cover it with a couple 
of doors and then throw 3 feet of d ~ r t  
on top It's the dirt that does it." 
Under angry questioning by mem- 
bers of the Senate Fore~gn Relat~ons 
Committee on March 31, Jones& hs- 
d d  not mean to imply t h z  nuclear 
war is "winnable." But h e  i m i s t d  that 
the Soviet Union, using s~mple arthen 
shelters tp~pro-t ~ ~ s _ c l t i z ~ i c m u c h  
b e ' f G q u i p p e d  to surmve an atom~c 
exchange than the US. 
Budget boost. The Reagan civil-de- 
fense plan is estimated to cost 4.2 bd- 
lion dollars over seven years, not 
countiilg inflation As a first step, Con- 
gress u bemg asked this year for 252 
milhon dollars, nearly double the civd- 
defense spending in the 1982 budget 
Some administration spokesmen 
were more restrained than FEMA offi- 
cials in describmg the new program. 
Assistant Defense Secretary Richard 
Perle told members of Congr_ess that 
tKe prG is '%tt~e-,m~o'_e-~th~ insur- 
an~e-~in.su_rance that in -mumstances 
short of a central strategic e x c b g e ,  
some lives 3 g h t  be wed-@ would 
otherwise be lost.'' 
ave a gloomy picture of 
W* s tne pian were 
e 
ffect: "Ev- ever put into e on 
w.osld s- . .  . ' d 
w o d d & d e d ~ a c w  
tion would be a c c o m ~ l J b ~ r h a , d  fgar-J-t&?&&e41~,. , 
Others were far more critical. S-ena- 
tor Alan Cranston (U-~allf .)  described -- 
*g%%??2 U ~ ~ U S "  
and a- hoax on 
the-: 
Retired Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, 
whose naval career included a stint as 
deputy head of the staff that selects 
strategic targets in the Soviet Union, 
said the plan "generates a mind-set to- 
ward nuclear war." 
It is impossible to hide from a nucle- 
ar attack, Gayler said, adding: "I've 
done the targeting. If you want to 
evacuate your cities, 1'11 target the 
evacuation areas." 
Several communities-among them 
Cambridge, Mass.; Sacramento Coun- 
ty, Calif.; Brattleboro, Vt., and Boulder 
County, Cola.--already have refused to 
take part in evacuation plans. 
On April 1, the Senate Armed Ser- 
vices Committee dealt the plan a blow 
when it refused to provide the funds 
needed to get started on the program. 
Twice before-in the early 1950s af- 
ter the Soviets developed their own 
nuclear weapons, and again in the ear- 
ly 1960s when the Berlin and Cuban 
crises brought the threat of war-the 
U.S. set civil-defense plans in motion. 
In both cases, the drives faded out after 
the crises had passed. 
In today's climate of rising worry 
over a nuclear conflict and concern 
over sharply increased budget deficits, 
Reagan's new attempt to overhaul U.S. 
civil-defense policy faces the toughest 
test yet. 0 





The Soviet Union has spent bil- 
lions to create what may be the 
world's most extensive civil-de- 
fense system, but to the average 
Muscovite there is little to show 
for the effort. 
Some of the subway stations 
have heavy blast doors, and civil- 
defense instructions are posted in 
some workplaces. Every factory 
or institution of any size has a 
full-time civil-defense warden 
who is responsible for being pre- 
pared for an emergency. Gram- 
mar-school children are taught 
how to crouch under desks and 
to shield their eyes from a nucle- 
ar blast. 
There is no evidence, howev- 
er, that the So\iets have ever 
tested on a large scale the evacu- 
ation of a major city-the one 
tactic that experts in the United 
States say could save as many as 
100 million Russian lives. 
Yet, behind the scenes, the So- 
viets have done far more than 
the U.S. to protect their leader- 
ship, their essential work force 
and their population. 
Blast shelters capable of hous- 
ing 110,000 key officials and 
workers have been built around 
Moscow, near factories and in 
other parts of the country. 
Top leaders also have standby 
mobile command posts in planes, 
ships and railroad cars. 
Head tor farm areas. In a cri- 
sis, the Russian people would be 
ordered to leave the cities- 
many of them on foot-and to 
assemble in rural collective-farm 
areas. Soviet booklets contain de- 
tailed descriptions of how ci\d- 
ians would be expected to pre- 
pare their own makeshift fallout 
shelters. 
While some US. experts worr? 
that the Soviet chii-defense pro- 
gram might embolden the Krem- 
lin to take chances in a crisis. one 
Moscow resident sums up the 
feeling of the man in the street: 
"Of course we have to take some 
civil-defense precautions. But we 
don't kid ourselves that it would 
save us in nuclear war. The major 
thing is to prevent nuclear war 
from happening." 
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Reagan Nme  Gas Request Deleted in Military Bill1 
gads request foe $54 million to begin werthe 1982 spending figure. 
making d binary nerve gas munitions. The United States suspended pmdw 
Ibc committee met for more than tion of lethal gases in the early 1970%. 
two weeks in dosed seaaim to reconcile B i i  munitions contain two m t o x i c  
slightly differing versions of legislation chemicals that mix and become nerve 
that would set spanding targets for pru- gas while the gas shell is in flight. The 
auiag def- weapam and equip Senatevotedtoapprwe the President's 
ment, for research and development $54 millim request to begin nerve gaa 
and tor operating and maintaining the pmductim, but the House p w e d  an 
cumed services. Todav it anreed to au- mendmat  striltinn the bfnarv m a  DW 
ary, Tbe MministrPhon's, request for 
W3.4 bill1011 reprssented ari increase in 
mIlitaIyspendiasofalma6t33percent 
- *---- 
Reproduced by Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress with 
Permission of Copyright Claimant 
statement today that the conferees had 
" d e f e d  without prejudice the request 
for funds for production of b i  chem- 
i d  m m i ~  because of U* stiarp 
divisions on this issue which exist in tbe 
Congress.'* 
This mtmnt, one Congressional staff 
member said, that "Congress is not giv- 
ing the White House money for the gas 
mrbutismakingmval~judsment 
Pnd is leaving open the powbility of a 
new propam next year." 
minMtation request to begin produo 
tion of nine MX intercontinental ballis- 
tic missiles, with b d h g  of 51.14 billian 
L. LW lir~lyarla~plrpor. Y . 
However, Sehator Tower said the corn- 
mttee had voted to provide $889 mlllioo 
to procure just five MX missiles. 
W*tlcn *1.ntaMXMaUc6 
' b m m m i t t e e ~ w l l d t o ~  
that a $7l5 million autborizatim for m 
search oa how and where to base the 
mated cost of the helicapter M 
aroused criticism earlnt this year. 
qA vote to cancel immediately 
ductm of the *-LO tigtms b o m c  
which the Air Force had inmuled to 
pbase out in the 1984 budget year. 
qA vote, reported earlier, to beglo 
procurement of 50 Loddseed C5 air 
planes, as well as three 
~reightaircrattthatwereaddedasa 
sort of "consolation price" for mem- 
bua of Congreplr who bad fought for a 
MX missiles and t158 million for ma- 
terials for MX basing not be spent until 
President Reagan has submitted a writ- 
tenplaa on how to base the missilea. 
Other significant actions gy the aa- ----+ temaecommittee included; ~AdecisiontospendS25mlllimto 
proam the Amy's attack hell- 
coptsr. Sharp inatpsar In the atl- 
_, - 
pmposal to sub6titute 74Ts lor tbe CS'u 
Senator Tower pr+ixd tbq work d 
the committee. 
But Senator Gary LIarl, Danoart d 
Cotorado, said the cmfercdlca zep~fl 
was "largely a charade" in which a ma- 
forltyofmnfe1#5hadban"ta,qpr 
to yield whenever its bill dllfsrsd from 
thawishustottbp~t.goa*~ 
